IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/revind/v66y2025i3d10.1007_s11151-024-09968-8.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Cartel Member or Free Rider? Detecting Collusion at the Firm Level

Author

Listed:
  • Andreas Bovin

    (DG Competition, European Commission)

Abstract

In this article, an approach to detect collusive conduct at the firm level is proposed, which consists of comparing implied marginal costs under alternative approaches that focus on (i) demand estimation and the assumption that firms maximize own profits; and (ii) cost estimation and the assumption that firms minimize costs. If firms cooperate and assumption (i) is violated, cost estimates start to diverge. Based on this divergence, a switching regression technique is employed to detect deviations from a competitive equilibrium. This method is empirically tested using data on Swedish truck manufacturer Scania.

Suggested Citation

  • Andreas Bovin, 2025. "Cartel Member or Free Rider? Detecting Collusion at the Firm Level," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 66(3), pages 293-324, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:66:y:2025:i:3:d:10.1007_s11151-024-09968-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-024-09968-8
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11151-024-09968-8
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11151-024-09968-8?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jan De Loecker & Pinelopi K. Goldberg & Amit K. Khandelwal & Nina Pavcnik, 2016. "Prices, Markups, and Trade Reform," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 445-510, March.
    2. Nevo, Aviv, 2001. "Measuring Market Power in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(2), pages 307-342, March.
    3. Federico Ciliberto & Jonathan W. Williams, 2014. "Does multimarket contact facilitate tacit collusion? Inference on conduct parameters in the airline industry," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(4), pages 764-791, December.
    4. Bond, Steve & Hashemi, Arshia & Kaplan, Greg & Zoch, Piotr, 2021. "Some unpleasant markup arithmetic: Production function elasticities and their estimation from production data," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 1-14.
    5. Carsten J. Crede, 2019. "A Structural Break Cartel Screen for Dating and Detecting Collusion," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 54(3), pages 543-574, May.
    6. Orley C. Ashenfelter & Daniel S. Hosken & Matthew C. Weinberg, 2015. "Efficiencies brewed: pricing and consolidation in the US beer industry," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(2), pages 328-361, June.
    7. Jan De Loecker & Frederic Warzynski, 2012. "Markups and Firm-Level Export Status," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2437-2471, October.
    8. Joseph E. Harrington, 2004. "Post‐Cartel Pricing During Litigation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(4), pages 517-533, December.
    9. Matthew Backus & Christopher Conlon & Michael Sinkinson, 2021. "Common Ownership in America: 1980–2017," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(3), pages 273-308, August.
    10. Rotemberg, Julio J & Saloner, Garth, 1986. "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars during Booms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 390-407, June.
    11. David Genesove & Wallace P. Mullin, 1998. "Testing Static Oligopoly Models: Conduct and Cost in the Sugar Industry, 1890-1914," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(2), pages 355-377, Summer.
    12. De Loecker, Jan, 2021. "Comment on (Un)pleasant ... by Bond et al (2020)," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 15-18.
    13. John C. Panzar & Robert D. Willig, 1977. "Economies of Scale in Multi-Output Production," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 91(3), pages 481-493.
    14. Kiefer, Nicholas M, 1980. "A Note on Switching Regressions and Logistic Discrimination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 1065-1069, May.
    15. Robert H. Porter, 1983. "A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee, 1880-1886," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 301-314, Autumn.
    16. David Gilo & Yossi Moshe & Yossi Spiegel, 2006. "Partial Cross Ownership and Tacit Collusion," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 81-99, Spring.
    17. Konings, Jozef & Van Cayseele, Patrick & Warzynski, Frederic, 2001. "The dynamics of industrial mark-ups in two small open economies: does national competition policy matter?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 841-859, April.
    18. Devesh Raval, 2023. "Testing the Production Approach to Markup Estimation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 90(5), pages 2592-2611.
    19. Daniel A. Ackerberg & Kevin Caves & Garth Frazer, 2015. "Identification Properties of Recent Production Function Estimators," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83, pages 2411-2451, November.
    20. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
    21. Jan De Loecker & Jan Eeckhout & Gabriel Unger, 2020. "The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications [“Econometric Tools for Analyzing Market Outcomes”]," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 135(2), pages 561-644.
    22. Ivaldi, Marc & Verboven, Frank, 2005. "Quantifying the effects from horizontal mergers in European competition policy," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(9-10), pages 669-691, December.
    23. Christian Beyer & Elke Kottmann & Korbinian von Blanckenburg, 2020. "The Welfare Implications of the European Trucks Cartel," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 55(2), pages 120-126, March.
    24. Hausman, Jerry A. & Leonard, Gregory K., 2005. "Using merger simulation models: Testing the underlying assumptions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(9-10), pages 693-698, December.
    25. Pedro Portugal & Olivier Blanchard, 2001. "What Hides Behind an Unemployment Rate: Comparing Portuguese and U.S. Labor Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 187-207, March.
    26. Porter, Robert H & Zona, J Douglas, 1993. "Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(3), pages 518-538, June.
    27. Chad Syverson, 2019. "Macroeconomics and Market Power: Context, Implications, and Open Questions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 33(3), pages 23-43, Summer.
    28. Nathan H. Miller & Matthew C. Weinberg, 2017. "Understanding the Price Effects of the MillerCoors Joint Venture," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85(6), pages 1763-1791, November.
    29. Reiss, Peter C. & Wolak, Frank A., 2007. "Structural Econometric Modeling: Rationales and Examples from Industrial Organization," Handbook of Econometrics, in: J.J. Heckman & E.E. Leamer (ed.), Handbook of Econometrics, edition 1, volume 6, chapter 64, Elsevier.
    30. Jan De Loecker & Paul T. Scott, 2016. "Estimating market power Evidence from the US Brewing Industry," NBER Working Papers 22957, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    31. Claude d'Aspremont & Alexis Jacquemin & Jean Jaskold Gabszewicz & John A. Weymark, 1983. "On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 17-25, February.
    32. David Gilo & Yossi Moshe & Yossi Spiegel, 2006. "Partial cross ownership and tacit collusion," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 81-99, March.
    33. Berry, Steven & Levinsohn, James & Pakes, Ariel, 1995. "Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(4), pages 841-890, July.
    34. Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Crede, Carsten J., 2020. "Post-cartel tacit collusion: Determinants, consequences, and prevention," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    35. repec:bla:econom:v:54:y:1987:i:214:p:185-206 is not listed on IDEAS
    36. Lee, Lung-Fei & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Switching Regression Models with Imperfect Sample Separation Information-With an Application on Cartel Stability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(2), pages 391-418, March.
    37. Raymond Deneckere & Carl Davidson, 1985. "Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(4), pages 473-486, Winter.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Belleflamme,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2015. "Industrial Organization," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107687899, Enero.
    2. Miller, Nathan H., 2025. "Industrial organization and The Rise of Market Power," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
    3. Gibbon, Alexandra J. & Schain, Jan Philip, 2023. "Rising markups, common ownership, and technological capacities," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    4. Gayle, Philip G. & Faheem, Adeel, 2024. "Post and hold regulation and competitive conduct: Evidence from the U.S. beer industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    5. Victor Aguirregabiria & Margaret Slade, 2017. "Empirical models of firms and industries," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(5), pages 1445-1488, December.
    6. Philipp Meinen & Ana Cristina Soares, 2022. "Markups and Financial Shocks," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 132(647), pages 2471-2499.
    7. Diane Coyle & John McHale & Ioannis Bournakis & Jen-Chung Mei, 2024. "Converging to Mediocrity: Trends in Firm-Level Markups in the United Kingdom 2008-2019," Working Papers 047, The Productivity Institute.
    8. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/6q707l4svn8k3bt630nhgdqgdu is not listed on IDEAS
    9. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/6q707l4svn8k3bt630nhgdqgdu is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Thomas Hasenzagl & Luis Perez, 2023. "The Micro-Aggregated Profit Share," Papers 2309.12945, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
    11. Chiara Bellucci & Armando Rungi, 2024. "Procompetitive effects of vertical takeovers. Evidence from the European Union," Papers 2411.12412, arXiv.org, revised May 2025.
    12. Vanessa Alviarez & Keith Head & Thierry Mayer, 2025. "Global Giants and Local Stars: How Changes in Brand Ownership Affect Competition," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 389-434, February.
    13. Grieco, Paul & Pinkse, Joris & Slade, Margaret, 2018. "Brewed in North America: Mergers, marginal costs, and efficiency," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 24-65.
    14. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/6q707l4svn8k3bt630nhgdqgdu is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Richard Schmalensee, 2012. "“On a Level with Dentists?” Reflections on the Evolution of Industrial Organization," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 41(3), pages 157-179, November.
    16. Gayle, Philip & Faheem, Adeel, 2024. "Post and Hold Regulation and Competitive Conduct: Evidence from the U.S. Beer Industry," MPRA Paper 122541, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Diane Coyle & John McHale & Ioannis Bournakis & Jen-Chung Mei, 2023. "Recent Trends in Firm-Level Total Factor Productivity in the United Kingdom: New Measures, New Puzzles," Working Papers 036, The Productivity Institute.
    18. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/6q707l4svn8k3bt630nhgdqgdu is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Ensar Yılmaz & Zeynep Kaplan, 2022. "Heterogeneity of market power: firm-level evidence," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 1207-1228, May.
    20. Kaplow, Louis & Shapiro, Carl, 2007. "Antitrust," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 1073-1225, Elsevier.
    21. Siying Ding & Ahmad Lashkaripour & Volodymyr Lugovskyy, 2024. "A Global Perspective on the Incidence of Monopoly Distortions," CESifo Working Paper Series 11211, CESifo.
    22. Stiebale, Joel & Suedekum, Jens & Woessner, Nicole, 2024. "Robots and the rise of European superstar firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    23. Joze Damijan & Jozef Konings & Aigerim Yergabulova, 2020. "Increasing market power in Slovenia: Role of diverging trends between exporters and non‐exporters," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(5), pages 1327-1345, May.
    24. Matthew Weinberg & Gloria Sheu & Nathan Miller, 2019. "Oligopolistic Price Leadership and Mergers: An Empirical Model of the U.S. Beer Industry," 2019 Meeting Papers 1210, Society for Economic Dynamics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cartel detection; Cartel prosecution; Switching regression; Conduct parameter;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:66:y:2025:i:3:d:10.1007_s11151-024-09968-8. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.