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A Canadian Perspective on Vertical Merger Policy and Guidelines

Author

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  • Thomas W. Ross

    (University of British Columbia)

  • Ralph A. Winter

    (University of British Columbia)

Abstract

We offer a comparative analysis of the trends in vertical merger policy in the U.S. and Canada. Guidelines issued by the U.S. agencies hold lessons for Canada, which has no guidelines that are dedicated specifically to vertical mergers. Canadian policy—as reflected in consent decrees and rules set in specific cases by the agency—has nonetheless developed along similar lines as in the U.S. The sharpest difference between policies in the two jurisdictions is in the consumer welfare standard of the U.S. policy versus a standard that is close to total surplus in Canada.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas W. Ross & Ralph A. Winter, 2021. "A Canadian Perspective on Vertical Merger Policy and Guidelines," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 59(2), pages 229-253, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:59:y:2021:i:2:d:10.1007_s11151-021-09816-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-021-09816-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Marcel Boyer & Thomas W. Ross & Ralph A. Winter, 2017. "The rise of economics in competition policy: A Canadian perspective," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(5), pages 1489-1524, December.
    2. William P. Rogerson, 2020. "Modelling and predicting the competitive effects of vertical mergers: The bargaining leverage over rivals effect," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(2), pages 407-436, May.
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    4. Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 2008. "Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to Market Definition," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt8z51b1q8, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
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    Cited by:

    1. Roger D. Blair, 2021. "The 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 59(2), pages 133-138, September.
    2. Francine Lafontaine & Margaret E. Slade, 2021. "Presumptions in Vertical Mergers: The Role of Evidence," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 59(2), pages 255-272, September.

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