Regulation in Vertically-Related Industries: Myths, Facts, and Policy
This paper explains why conclusions that appear to be “facts” can truly be “myths” in industries like today’s telecommunications industry, where key suppliers operate in multiple vertical stages of production. The paper explains, for example, why an entrant’s decision to make or buy critical production inputs may be largely insensitive to the price of these inputs. It also reviews why a vertically-integrated producer (VIP) may prefer to assist, rather than disadvantage, retail rivals, and why a VIP may be disadvantaging rivals even when it provides them with the same wholesale service quality that it provides to its own retail affiliate. Copyright Springer 2006
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- David Mandy & David Sappington, 2007.
"Incentives for sabotage in vertically related industries,"
Journal of Regulatory Economics,
Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 235-260, June.
- David Mandy & David E. M. Sappington, 2004. "Incentives for Sabotage in Vertically Related Industries," Working Papers 0404, Department of Economics, University of Missouri, revised 16 Dec 2004.
- Author One David Harbord & Author Two Marco Ottaviani, 2002. "Anticompetitive Contracts in the U.K. Pay-TV Market," Industrial Organization 0203002, EconWPA.
- Gilbert, Richard J & Riordan, Michael H, 2005. "Product Improvement and Technological Tying in a Winner-Take-All Market," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt3v04b2rx, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Richard J. Gilbert & Michael H. Riordan, 2003. "Product improvement and technological tying in a winner-take-all market," Discussion Papers 0304-11, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
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