Entry may increase network providers' profit
In this paper the incentives for platform sponsors to open up their networks for independent rivals is analyzed. It is shown that open access may increase the platform sponsors' profit levels and enhance quality improving investments. In addition, it is shown that a commitment to allow entry reduces the difference between ex ante and ex post compatibility incentives.
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Volume (Year): 33 (2009)
Issue (Month): 9 (October)
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