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Entry may increase network providers' profit

Author

Listed:
  • Foros, Øystein
  • Kind, Hans Jarle
  • Sand, Jan Yngve

Abstract

In this paper the incentives for platform sponsors to open up their networks for independent rivals is analyzed. It is shown that open access may increase the platform sponsors' profit levels and enhance quality improving investments. In addition, it is shown that a commitment to allow entry reduces the difference between ex ante and ex post compatibility incentives.

Suggested Citation

  • Foros, Øystein & Kind, Hans Jarle & Sand, Jan Yngve, 2009. "Entry may increase network providers' profit," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(9), pages 486-494, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:telpol:v:33:y:2009:i:9:p:486-494
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    Keywords

    Compatibility Investment incentives;

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