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Up-front Franchise Fees and Ongoing Variable Payments as Substitutes: An Agency Perspective

  • Luis Vázquez

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    This article provides evidence on the determinants of the compensation arrangements used in franchise relationships. While the empirical literature has studied two of these compensation arrangements – the royalty rate and the up-front franchise fee – this work expands the analysis to another important source of revenues for franchisors: the sales of inputs to franchisees at prices greater than marginal costs. Consistent with predictions suggested by agency theory, the compensation arrangements studied appear to function as substitutes. The results also reveal that the value of the services provided by franchisors to franchisees strongly affects the compensation arrangements studied, so a capital goal of these arrangements is to recover the costs of the services offered by franchisors. Copyright Springer 2005

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11151-005-0983-z
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    Article provided by Springer in its journal Review of Industrial Organization.

    Volume (Year): 26 (2005)
    Issue (Month): 4 (06)
    Pages: 445-460

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:26:y:2005:i:4:p:445-460
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100336

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    1. Susan Athey & Scott Stern, 1998. "An Empirical Framework for Testing Theories About Complimentarity in Organizational Design," NBER Working Papers 6600, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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