Adoption Dynamics in Buyer-Side Exchanges
The purpose of this paper is to understand buyer/seller adoption dynamics in independent, buyer-side B2B exchanges. In a stylized model, we assume that the main role of the exchange is to reduce search costs for buyers. Buyers and sellers enter or exit the exchange based on the relative economic surplus (loss) they receive inside vs. outside the exchange. We contrast two situations: one where participants' switching cost to join the institution is negligible and another, in which it is significant. In an extension, we also explore the impact of buyer/seller heterogeneity on adoption dynamics. We have three key findings with relevant implications for practice. First, we find that the general view that demand and supply (so-called “liquidity”) either grows or shrinks in the marketplace may not hold. In the presence of switching costs, the exchange can evolve to a stable state with only partial market participation. Second, our results suggest that the exchange is better off subsidizing buyers as opposed to sellers in order to achieve the so-called “critical mass”, beyond which there is full participation. Finally, we find that while in general, “minor” buyers of the industry have more incentive joining the exchange, when the fixed participation fee of the exchange is high, it is “major” buyers who are likely to join first. For sellers, this is not the case: minor sellers are always more keen in participating in a buyer-side exchange. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 1 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/business+%26+management/marketing/journal/11129/PS2|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jeffrey M. Perloff & Steven C. Salop, 1985.
"Equilibrium with Product Differentiation,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 52(1), pages 107-120.
- Perloff, Jeffrey M & Salop, Steven, 1984. "Equilibrium with product differentiation," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt4cq0m6s3, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
- Paul Klemperer, 1995. "Competition when Consumers have Switching Costs: An Overview with Applications to Industrial Organization, Macroeconomics, and International Trade," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 62(4), pages 515-539.
- Frank M. Bass, 1969. "A New Product Growth for Model Consumer Durables," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 15(5), pages 215-227, January.
- Steven C. Salop, 1979. "Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 141-156, Spring.
- Sarkar, Mitrabarun & Butler, Brian & Steinfield, Charles, 1998. "Cybermediaries in Electronic Marketspace: Toward Theory Building," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 215-221, March.
- J. Yannis Bakos, 1997. "Reducing Buyer Search Costs: Implications for Electronic Marketplaces," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 43(12), pages 1676-1692, December.
- Michael R. Baye & John Morgan, 2001. "Information Gatekeepers on the Internet and the Competitiveness of Homogeneous Product Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 454-474, June. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:qmktec:v:1:y:2003:i:3:p:305-335. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.