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Conditional payments and self-protection

  • Liqun Liu


  • Andrew Rettenmaier
  • Thomas Saving
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    Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Risk and Uncertainty.

    Volume (Year): 38 (2009)
    Issue (Month): 2 (April)
    Pages: 159-172

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:38:y:2009:i:2:p:159-172
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    1. Jindapon, Paan & Neilson, William S., 2007. "Higher-order generalizations of Arrow-Pratt and Ross risk aversion: A comparative statics approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 719-728, September.
    2. Kelsey, D. & Nordquist, G.L., 1989. "A More General Measure Of Risk Aversion When Utility Is State-Dependent," Papers 177, Australian National University - Department of Economics.
    3. Dionne, G. & Eeckhoudt, L., 1984. "Self-Insurance, Self-Protection and Increased Risk Aversion," Cahiers de recherche 8424, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    4. L. Eeckhoudt & C. Gollier, 2005. "The impact of prudence on optimal prevention," Post-Print hal-00199781, HAL.
    5. Menezes, C & Geiss, C & Tressler, J, 1980. "Increasing Downside Risk," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(5), pages 921-32, December.
    6. Bleichrodt, Han & Crainich, David & Eeckhoudt, Louis, 2003. "Comorbidities and the willingness to pay for health improvements," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(11), pages 2399-2406, October.
    7. repec:oup:qjecon:v:91:y:1977:i:1:p:143-56 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Quiggin, John, 2002. " Risk and Self-Protection: A State-Contingent View," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 133-45, September.
    9. Viscusi, W Kip & Aldy, Joseph E, 2003. " The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review of Market Estimates throughout the World," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 5-76, August.
    10. Jullien, B. & Salanie, B. & Salanie, F., 1998. "Should More Risk-Averse Agents Exert More Effort?," Papers 98.489, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
    11. repec:reg:rpubli:282 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. George Sweeney & T. Randolph Beard, 1992. "Self-Protection in the Expected-Utility-of-Wealth Model: An Impossibility Theorem," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 17(2), pages 147-158, December.
    13. Jones-Lee, Michael W, 1974. "The Value of Changes in the Probability of Death or Injury," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(4), pages 835-49, July/Aug..
    14. L. Eeckhoudt & H. Schlesinger, 2006. "Putting risk in its proper place," Post-Print hal-00283170, HAL.
    15. Viscusi, W Kip & Evans, William N, 1990. "Utility Functions That Depend on Health Status: Estimates and Economic Implications," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 353-74, June.
    16. McGuire, Martin C & Pratt, John & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1991. " Paying to Improve Your Chances: Gambling or Insurance?," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 329-38, December.
    17. Keenan, Donald C & Snow, Arthur, 2002. " Greater Downside Risk Aversion," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 267-77, May.
    18. Calfee, John E & Rubin, Paul H, 1992. "Some Implications of Damage Payments for Nonpecuniary Losses," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 371-411, June.
    19. Gravelle, Hugh & Waterson, Michael, 1993. "No Win, No Fee: Some Economics of Contingent Legal Fees," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(420), pages 1205-20, September.
    20. Kimball, Miles S, 1990. "Precautionary Saving in the Small and in the Large," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(1), pages 53-73, January.
    21. Karni, Edi, 1983. "Risk Aversion for State-Dependent Utility Functions: Measurement and Applications," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 24(3), pages 637-47, October.
    22. Emons, Winand, 2000. "Expertise, contingent fees, and insufficient attorney effort," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 21-33, March.
    23. Lee, Kangoh, 1998. "Risk Aversion and Self-Insurance-cum-Protection," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 139-50, November.
    24. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 2003. "Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 165-188.
    25. Neilson, William S, 1998. "Optimal Punishment Schemes with State-Dependent Preferences," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 36(2), pages 266-71, April.
    26. Frech, H. III, 1994. "State-dependent utility and the tort system as insurance: Strict liability versus negligence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 261-271, September.
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