Trade with Endogenous Market Power Under Asymmetric and Incomplete Information
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References listed on IDEAS
- Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680.
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More about this item
KeywordsD4 market structure and pricing; L1 market structure; firm strategy; and market performance; D8 information; knowledge; and uncertainty; C7 game theory and bargaining theory;
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
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