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The Impact of the Interaction of Gender Norms and Wife’s Relative Income on Housework Sharing in Japan

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  • Chu Zhang

    (Kobe University)

Abstract

According to economic theory, the rise in women’s social status leads to an increase in their bargaining power within the household and simultaneously reduces their burden of housework. However, some studies report that when the wife’s relative income exceeds a certain level, her burden of housework increases instead. In this study, we determine whether wife’s relative income affects household chores linearly, and examine the relationship between wife’s relative income, gender norms, and housework from a bargaining perspective. We use Japanese panel data on attitudes toward traditional gender norms, couples’ income, and housework. The results show a linear relationship between the division of housework and wife’s relative income within Japanese households. However, this linear relationship is heterogeneous due to gender norms. Specifically, we find that gender norms do not impact the division of housework directly. Instead, there is an indirect weakening of the impact of wife’s relative income on the division of housework. This implies that regardless of household norms, an increase in wife’s relative income leads to a more equitable housework allocation, even though the effect is smaller for households with traditional norms. These results suggest that narrowing the wage gap between men and women in Japan may lead to a more equal division of housework.

Suggested Citation

  • Chu Zhang, 2025. "The Impact of the Interaction of Gender Norms and Wife’s Relative Income on Housework Sharing in Japan," Journal of Family and Economic Issues, Springer, vol. 46(2), pages 460-478, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:jfamec:v:46:y:2025:i:2:d:10.1007_s10834-024-09958-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s10834-024-09958-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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