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Gendered Housework: Spousal Relative Income, Parenthood and Traditional Gender Identity Norms

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  • Joanna Syrda

Abstract

Despite women’s increased market employment and earnings, the gender housework gap persists. Drawing on US data from 1999 to 2017 waves of Panel Study of Income Dynamics (6643 dual-earner heterosexual couples, 19,602 couple-year observations) and using couples fixed effects, this study examines the impact of having children on the relationship between partners’ housework time and spousal relative income. While parenthood could theoretically incentivize a more efficient division of labour, I find it has a traditionalizing effect and parents’ housework exhibits significant gender deviance neutralization, while housework division of childless couples is independent of relative income. In fact, these effects are so sizeable, that parents’ gender gap in the division of domestic labour increases in the higher range of women’s relative income. As the gender earnings gap closes and women’s relative income increases, the gender housework gap opens. Additionally, the traditionalizing parenthood effect is identified only among married and not cohabiting parents.

Suggested Citation

  • Joanna Syrda, 2023. "Gendered Housework: Spousal Relative Income, Parenthood and Traditional Gender Identity Norms," Work, Employment & Society, British Sociological Association, vol. 37(3), pages 794-813, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:woemps:v:37:y:2023:i:3:p:794-813
    DOI: 10.1177/09500170211069780
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Chu Zhang, 2025. "The Impact of the Interaction of Gender Norms and Wife’s Relative Income on Housework Sharing in Japan," Journal of Family and Economic Issues, Springer, vol. 46(2), pages 460-478, June.

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