Policy Bias Equivalence under Common Agency
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- Mike Felgenhauer & Hans Peter Grüner, 2008.
"Committees and Special Interests,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory,
Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(2), pages 219-243, April.
- Grüner, Hans Peter & Felgenhauer, Mike, 2003. "Committees and special interests," Working Paper Series 293, European Central Bank.
- Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "Ideological uncertainty and lobbying competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 456-481, April.
- Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "Ideological Uncertainty and Lobbying Competition," MPRA Paper 6992, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Celentani, Marco & Ganuza, Juan-Jose, 2002. "Corruption and competition in procurement," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(7), pages 1273-1303, July.
- Marco Celentani & Juan J. Ganuza, 2000. "Corruption and competition in procurement," Economics Working Papers 464, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Mar 2001.
- Andreas Polk, 2002. "How Special Interests Shape Policy - A Survey," SOI - Working Papers 0206, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich, revised Jul 2002. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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