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How Special Interests Shape Policy - A Survey

Author

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  • Andreas Polk

Abstract

This paper surveys recent approaches towards lobbying if interest groups influence the decision of an incumbent government. It describes the two main channels of influence which mainly exist in parallel, namely contribution payments and the transmission of information through lobbying. Recent extensions to the two basic lobbying models are discussed in great detail. Thereafter follows a short overview over current research, which tries to consolidate the two distinct branches of literature into a general lobbying model. The survey concludes with a summary of the main insights and indicates promising directions of further research.

Suggested Citation

  • Andreas Polk, 2002. "How Special Interests Shape Policy - A Survey," SOI - Working Papers 0206, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich, revised Jul 2002.
  • Handle: RePEc:soz:wpaper:0206
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    File URL: http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/wp_soi/wp0206.pdf
    File Function: Revised version, 2002
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Walter Hettich & Stanley L. Winer, 2004. "Regulation and Taxation: Analyzing Policy Interdependence," Carleton Economic Papers 04-03, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
    2. Mike Felgenhauer, 2007. "Policy Bias Equivalence under Common Agency," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 90(3), pages 295-312, April.
    3. Andreas Polk, 2002. "Lobbying Activities of Multinational Firms," SOI - Working Papers 0205, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich, revised Jun 2002.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    lobbying; interest groups; political decision making; contribution payments; information transmission;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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