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A contest model of balancing

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  • Will Kielm

    (University of Michigan)

Abstract

This paper considers the issue of balancing, i.e., forming an alliance against a superpower, by adopting a contest theory which is widely used in rational choice approach to international relations. The main result is that member states increase their military spending rather than reduce it after they choose balancing, implying that diffusion of responsibility does not occur in equilibrium after balancing. This is because the alliance requires more military spending to respond optimally against the increase in military spending of the unipole as a response to the alliance formation. This paper also shows that more than one state facing against a superpower always prefers balancing by joining in an alliance despite the resulting increase in its military expenditures.

Suggested Citation

  • Will Kielm, 2024. "A contest model of balancing," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 141(3), pages 195-221, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:141:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s00712-023-00848-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s00712-023-00848-5
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    Keywords

    Balancing; Contest; Diffusion of responsibility; Free riding; Success probability; Winner-takes-all;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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