Competition among the elites, property rights protection and economic performance
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More about this item
KeywordsInstitutions; Competition; Property rights; Economic performance; Regulation; H20; O10; P16;
- H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
- O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
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