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Optimal Protection of Property Rights in a General Equilibrium Model of Growth

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  • George Economides
  • Hyun Park
  • Apostolis Philippopoulos

Abstract

We incorporate weak property rights into an otherwise standard general equilibrium model of growth and second-best optimal policy. In this setup, the state plays two of its key roles: it protects property rights and provides public services. The government chooses policy (the income tax rate, as well as the allocation of collected tax revenues between law enforcement and public services) to maximize the growth rate of the economy. The focus of our analysis is on how weak property rights generate multiple decentralized competitive equilibria, the different properties of these equilibria, and the implications of second-best optimal policies. Copyright The editors of the "Scandinavian Journal of Economics" 2007 .

Suggested Citation

  • George Economides & Hyun Park & Apostolis Philippopoulos, 2007. "Optimal Protection of Property Rights in a General Equilibrium Model of Growth," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 109(1), pages 153-175, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:109:y:2007:i:1:p:153-175
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    Cited by:

    1. Evangelos V. Dioikitopoulos & Sarantis Kalyvitis, 2015. "Optimal Fiscal Policy with Endogenous Time Preference," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(6), pages 848-873, December.
    2. Andreas Irmen & Johanna Kuehnel, 2011. "Property rights, optimal public enforcement, and growth," CREA Discussion Paper Series 11-18, Center for Research in Economic Analysis, University of Luxembourg.
    3. Vella, Eugenia & Dioikitopoulos, Evangelos V. & Kalyvitis, Sarantis, 2015. "Green Spending Reforms, Growth, And Welfare With Endogenous Subjective Discounting," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 19(06), pages 1240-1260, September.
    4. Konstantinos Angelopoulos & George Economides & Vanghelis Vassilatos, 2011. "Do institutions matter for economic fluctuations? Weak property rights in a business cycle model for Mexico," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 14(3), pages 511-531, July.
    5. Barbosa, Natália & Faria, Ana Paula, 2011. "Innovation across Europe: How important are institutional differences?," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 40(9), pages 1157-1169.
    6. Vasilev, Aleksandar, 2013. "On the cost of rent-seeking by government bureaucrats in a Real-Business-Cycle framework," SIRE Discussion Papers 2013-84, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    7. Shiyuan Pan, 2011. "Competition among the elites, property rights protection and economic performance," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 104(2), pages 139-158, October.
    8. George Economides & Hyun Park & Apostolis Philippopoulos & Stelios Sakkas, 2015. "On the Composition of Public Spending and Taxes," CESifo Working Paper Series 5510, CESifo Group Munich.
    9. Vasilev, Aleksandar, 2013. "Essays on Real Business Cycle Modeling and the Public Sector," EconStor Theses, ZBW - German National Library of Economics, number 130522.

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