The Tyranny of Concepts: CUDIE (Cumulated, Depreciated, Investment Effort) Is Not Capital
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- Pritchett, Lant, 2000. "The tyranny of concepts - CUDIE (Cumulated, Depreciated Investment Effort) is NOT capital," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2341, The World Bank.
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More about this item
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
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