A Common Pool Resource Game with Sequential Decisions and Experimental Evidence
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References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Vincent Mak & Rami Zwick & Akshay R. Rao & Jake A. Pattaratanakun, 2014. ""Pay What You Want" as Threshold Public Good Provision," Working Papers 201403, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
- Jason Delaney & Sarah Jacobson, 2016.
"Payments or Persuasion: Common Pool Resource Management with Price and Non-price Measures,"
Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(4), pages 747-772, December.
- Delaney, Jason & Jacobson, Sarah, 2013. "Payments or persuasion: common pool resource management with price and non-price measures," Department of Economics Working Papers 2013-02, Department of Economics, Williams College, revised Mar 2015.
- Kimbrough, Erik O. & Vostroknutov, Alexander, 2015.
"The social and ecological determinants of common pool resource sustainability,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 38-53.
- Erik O. Kimbrough & Alexander Vostroknutov, 2013. "The Social and Ecological Determinants of Common Pool Resource Sustainability," Discussion Papers dp13-06, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
- Mak, Vincent & Zwick, Rami & Rao, Akshay R. & Pattaratanakun, Jake A., 2015. "“Pay what you want” as threshold public good provision," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 30-43.
- Raja Timilsina & Koji Kotani & Yoshio Kamijo, 2016. "Sustainability of common pool resources: A field-experimental approach," Working Papers SDES-2016-6, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Apr 2016.
- Herings, P.J.J. & Meshalkin, A.V. & Predtetchinski, A., 2012. "A folk theorem for bargaining games," Research Memorandum 055, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
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Keywordslaboratory experiments; common pool resources; games;
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