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A Common Pool Resource Game with Sequential Decisions and Experimental Evidence

Author

Listed:
  • Lluis Bru
  • Susana Cabrera
  • C. Capra
  • Rosario Gomez

Abstract

We describe a common pool resource game in which players choose how much of the stock to extract in a sequential manner. There are two choices and one represents taking a larger proportion of the stock than the other. After a player makes a choice, the remaining stock grows at a constant rate. We consider a game with a finite number of alternating moves. It is shown that changes in the larger proportion of the stock that the players are allowed to take and the growth rate affect equilibrium, but have little effect on behavior in the laboratory. In addition to observing more cooperation than predicted, we observe that parameters that are strategically irrelevant affect behavior. The results of this research might help policy makers in developing adequate policies to prevent overexploitation of some natural renewable resources. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003

Suggested Citation

  • Lluis Bru & Susana Cabrera & C. Capra & Rosario Gomez, 2003. "A Common Pool Resource Game with Sequential Decisions and Experimental Evidence," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 6(1), pages 91-114, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:6:y:2003:i:1:p:91-114 DOI: 10.1023/A:1024209010570
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. C. Monica Capra, 1999. "Anomalous Behavior in a Traveler's Dilemma?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 678-690.
    2. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1981. "Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 92-100, August.
    3. Herr, Andrew & Gardner, Roy & Walker, James M., 1997. "An Experimental Study of Time-Independent and Time-Dependent Externalities in the Commons," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 77-96, April.
    4. McKelvey Richard D. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 6-38, July.
    5. Walker, James M & Gardner, Roy, 1992. "Probabilistic Destruction of Common-Pool Resources: Experimental Evidence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(414), pages 1149-1161, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mak, Vincent & Zwick, Rami & Rao, Akshay R. & Pattaratanakun, Jake A., 2015. "“Pay what you want” as threshold public good provision," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 30-43.
    2. Vincent Mak & Rami Zwick & Akshay R. Rao & Jake A. Pattaratanakun, 2014. ""Pay What You Want" as Threshold Public Good Provision," Working Papers 201403, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    3. Jason Delaney & Sarah Jacobson, 2016. "Payments or Persuasion: Common Pool Resource Management with Price and Non-price Measures," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, pages 747-772.
    4. Kimbrough, Erik O. & Vostroknutov, Alexander, 2015. "The social and ecological determinants of common pool resource sustainability," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 38-53.
    5. Raja Timilsina & Koji Kotani & Yoshio Kamijo, 2016. "Sustainability of common pool resources: A field-experimental approach," Working Papers SDES-2016-6, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Apr 2016.
    6. Kimbrough Erik O. & Vostroknutov Alexander, 2012. "Using Rules to Screen for Cooperative Types: Rule-Following and Restraint in Common Pool Resource Systems," Research Memorandum 055, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).

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