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It is Hobbes, not Rousseau: an experiment on voting and redistribution

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  • Antonio Cabrales & Rosemarie Nagel & José Rodríguez Mora, 2012. "It is Hobbes, not Rousseau: an experiment on voting and redistribution," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 15(2), pages 278-308, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:15:y:2012:i:2:p:278-308
    DOI: 10.1007/s10683-011-9300-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg & Jörgen W. Weibull, 1999. "Social Norms and Economic Incentives in the Welfare State," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(1), pages 1-35.
    2. Orazio P. Attanasio & James Banks & Sarah Tanner, 2002. "Asset Holding and Consumption Volatility," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(4), pages 771-792, August.
    3. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868.
    4. Van Huyck, John B & Battalio, Raymond C & Beil, Richard O, 1990. "Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 234-248, March.
    5. John Hassler & José V. Rodríguez Mora & Kjetil Storesletten & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2003. "The Survival of the Welfare State," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 87-112, March.
    6. Alberto Alesina & George-Marios Angeletos, 2005. "Fairness and Redistribution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 960-980, September.
    7. Matthias Sutter & Stefan Haigner & Martin G. Kocher, 2010. "Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 77(4), pages 1540-1566.
    8. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2000. "Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1167-1199.
    9. Atkinson, Anthony B., 1995. "The Welfare State and Economic Performance," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 48(2), pages 171-98, June.
    10. Axel Ockenfels & Gary E. Bolton, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March.
    11. Berninghaus, Siegfried K. & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin, 1998. "Time horizon and equilibrium selection in tacit coordination games: Experimental results," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 231-248, October.
    12. Tyran, Jean-Robert & Sausgruber, Rupert, 2006. "A little fairness may induce a lot of redistribution in democracy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 469-485, February.
    13. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
    14. Arthur Schram, 2005. "Artificiality: The tension between internal and external validity in economic experiments," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(2), pages 225-237.
    15. repec:cup:apsrev:v:84:y:1990:i:02:p:461-477_19 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. repec:cup:apsrev:v:72:y:1978:i:02:p:575-598_15 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Atkinson, Anthony B., 1995. "The Welfare State and Economic Performance," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 48(2), pages 171-198, June.
    18. Schram, Arthur & Sonnemans, Joep, 1996. "Why people vote: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 417-442, August.
    19. Plott, Charles R, 1982. "Industrial Organization Theory and Experimental Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 20(4), pages 1485-1527, December.
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    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jörg Oechssler, 2013. "Finitely repeated games with social preferences," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 16(2), pages 222-231, June.
    2. repec:kap:expeco:v:20:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s10683-017-9516-5 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Balafoutas, Loukas & Kocher, Martin G. & Putterman, Louis & Sutter, Matthias, 2013. "Equality, equity and incentives: An experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 32-51.
    4. Deffains, Bruno & Espinosa, Romain & Thöni, Christian, 2016. "Political self-serving bias and redistribution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 67-74.
    5. repec:eee:pubeco:v:150:y:2017:i:c:p:39-52 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Bruno Deffains & Romain Espinosa & Christian Thöni, 2016. "Political self-serving bias and redistribution," Post-Print halshs-01634208, HAL.
    7. Feige, Christian & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin, 2015. "Voting and transfer payments in a threshold public goods game," Working Paper Series in Economics 73, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Business Engineering.
    8. Claudia M. Buch & Christoph Engel, 2012. "The Tradeoff between Redistribution and effort: Evidence from the Field and from the Lab," IAW Discussion Papers 81, Institut für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung (IAW).
    9. Claudia M. Buch & Christoph Engel, 2012. "Effort and Redistribution: Better Cousins Than One Might Have Thought," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2012_10, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, revised Sep 2014.
    10. Anke Gerber & Andreas Nicklisch & Stefan Voigt, 2013. "Strategic Choices for Redistribution and the Veil of Ignorance: Theory and Experimental Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 4423, CESifo Group Munich.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Redistribution; Political equilibrium; Voting; Multiple equilibria; Experiments; C72; C92; D72; E24; H24; I31; O38;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • I31 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - General Welfare, Well-Being
    • O38 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy

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