On the Flexibility of Optimal Policies for Green Design
Several recent papers show that different combinations of taxes and subsidies can achieve the social optimum for green design and household waste management when there are various market failures. This note shows that such policy flexibility exists only if all relevant actions by individual agents can be properly targeted by economic instruments. If the household can make a private effort to reduce waste, then an optimal policy is shown to be a unique combination of given economic instruments. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001
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Volume (Year): 18 (2001)
Issue (Month): 4 (April)
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Don Fullerton & Wenbo Wu, 1996.
"Policies for Green Design,"
NBER Working Papers
5594, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Cremer, Helmuth & Gahvari, Firouz & Ladoux, Norbert, 1998. "Externalities and optimal taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 343-364, December.
- Choe, Chongwoo & Fraser, Iain, 1999.
"An Economic Analysis of Household Waste Management,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 234-246, September.
- Chongwoo Choe & Iain Fraser, 1997. "An Economic Analysis of Household Waste Management," Working Papers 1997.11, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
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