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Emergence of an innovative regulation mode in water utilities in France: between commission regulation and franchise bidding


  • Lætitia Guérin-Schneider


  • Michel Nakhla


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Suggested Citation

  • Lætitia Guérin-Schneider & Michel Nakhla, 2012. "Emergence of an innovative regulation mode in water utilities in France: between commission regulation and franchise bidding," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 23-45, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:33:y:2012:i:1:p:23-45 DOI: 10.1007/s10657-010-9169-8

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Gert Brunekreeft, 2004. "Regulatory Threat in Vertically Related Markets: The Case of German Electricity," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 285-305, May.
    2. Levy, Brian & Spiller, Pablo T, 1994. "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 201-246, October.
    3. Ephraim Clark & Gérard Mondello, 2000. "Water Management in France: Delegation and Irreversibility," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 3, pages 325-352, November.
    4. Littlechild, Stephen, 1988. "Economic Regulation of Privatised Water Authorities and Some Further Reflections," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(2), pages 40-68, Summer.
    5. Glachant, Jean-Michel & Dubois, Ute & Perez, Yannick, 2008. "Deregulating with no regulator: Is the German electricity transmission regime institutionally correct?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(5), pages 1600-1610, May.
    6. Richard A. Posner, 1974. "Theories of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(2), pages 335-358, Autumn.
    7. Buchanan, James M, 1987. "Tax Reform as Political Choice," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 29-35, Summer.
    8. Francesco Parisi, 2004. "Positive, Normative and Functional Schools in Law and Economics," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 259-272, December.
    9. Noel Uri, 2003. "Service Quality Effects of Incentive Regulation on Access Service in Telecommunications in the United States," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 369-390, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Michel Nakhla, 2016. "Innovative regulations, incomplete contracts and ownership structure in the water utilities," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 445-469, December.

    More about this item


    Regulation; Public utilities; Water utilities; Law and economics of regulated industries; Reform design; Institutions; K23; B20; L43; L95; D02; E61;

    JEL classification:

    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • B20 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - General
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
    • L95 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Gas Utilities; Pipelines; Water Utilities
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination


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