Emergence of an innovative regulation mode in water utilities in France: between commission regulation and franchise bidding
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DOI: 10.1007/s10657-010-9169-8
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Cited by:
- Marine Colon & Laëtitia Guerin Schneider, 2016. "Le développement de pratiques d'accountability dans le secteur des services d'eau : un changement institutionnel inabouti ?," Post-Print hal-01902120, HAL.
- Michel Nakhla, 2016. "Innovative regulations, incomplete contracts and ownership structure in the water utilities," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 445-469, December.
- Marine Colon & Lætitia Guérin-Schneider & Quentin Braen Terrien, 2023. "Le développement des outils numériques de reporting facilite-t-il le contrôle externe ? Le cas de la régulation des opérateurs d’eau en France," Post-Print hal-04360217, HAL.
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More about this item
Keywords
Regulation; Public utilities; Water utilities; Law and economics of regulated industries; Reform design; Institutions; K23; B20; L43; L95; D02; E61;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
- B20 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - General
- L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
- L95 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Gas Utilities; Pipelines; Water Utilities
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
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