Water Management in France: Delegation and Irreversibility
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More about this item
KeywordsWater management; Delegation; Insurance mechanisms; Technological Changes; Real Options;
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- Q00 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - General - - - General
- Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
- O33 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
- G13 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing
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