European Labour Law and Severance Pay Determination in Collective Redundancies
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1011256729444
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Cited by:
- Yannick Gabuthy & Eve-Angéline Lambert & Lionel Thomas, 2013. "Severance Payment: Incentive or Lethargy Effect?," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 60(1), pages 43-55, February.
- Christian Grund, 2006.
"Severance payments for dismissed employees in Germany,"
European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 49-71, July.
- Grund, Christian, 2003. "Severance Payments for Dismissed Employees in Germany," IZA Discussion Papers 875, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Grund, Christian, 2004. "Severance Payments for Dismissed Employees in Germany," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 4/2004, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Miguel Á. Malo & Ángel Martín-Román & Alfonso Moral, 2018.
"“Peer effects” or “quasi-peer effects” in Spanish labour court rulings,"
European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 497-525, June.
- Malo, Miguel Ángel & Martín-Román, Ángel L. & Moral, Alfonso, 2016. "“Peer effects” or “quasi-peer effects” in Spanish labour court rulings," MPRA Paper 72669, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Miguel Malo & Joaquín Pérez, 2003.
"Individual Dismissals in Europe and the United States: A Model on the Influence of the Legal Framework on Firing Costs,"
European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 47-63, January.
- Malo, M.A aand Joaquin Pérez., 2002. "Individual dismissals in Europe and the United States: A model on the influence of the legal framework on firing costs," Doctorado en Economía- documentos de trabajo 9/02, Programa de doctorado en Economía. Universidad de Alcalá..
- Camille Signoretto & Julie Valentin, 2019.
"Individual dismissals for personal and economic reasons in French firms: One or two models?,"
European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 241-265, October.
- Camille Signoretto & Julie Valentin, 2019. "Individual dismissals for personal and economic reasons in French firms: One or two models?," Post-Print halshs-02274607, HAL.
- Camille Signoretto & Julie Valentin, 2019. "Individual dismissals for personal and economic reasons in French firms: One or two models?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-02274607, HAL.
- Christian Grund, 2006. "Overcompensation by severance payments," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 38(8), pages 925-930.
- José María Arranz & Carlos García Serrano, 2015. "Los sistemas de prestaciones por desempleo de “experience rating”. Un análisis de los despidos temporales y los subsidios cruzados en España," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 212(1), pages 129-168, March.
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Keywords
severance pay; collective redundancies; dismissal costs; Labour Law;All these keywords.
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