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Economic and legal institutionalism: What can they learn from each other?

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  • Dick Ruiter

Abstract

The main argument of this paper is that both constitutional political economy and institutional legal theory can benefit from adopting certain central notions from each other. On the one hand, the legal notion of validity can help to clarify certain obscurities concerning the mode of existence of institutions in constitutional political economy. On the other hand, the economic notion of voluntary choice can serve as a point of departure for institutional legal theory in developing substantive criteria for the evaluation of legal systems without appealing to natural law ideas. Copyright George Mason University 1994

Suggested Citation

  • Dick Ruiter, 1994. "Economic and legal institutionalism: What can they learn from each other?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 99-115, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:5:y:1994:i:1:p:99-115
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02393258
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 2006. "The Power to Tax," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521027922.
    2. -, 1986. "Agenda = Agenda," Series Históricas 8749, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    D72; K100;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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