Reasoning about rules
The Reason of Rules stands as a key text in the development of Constitutional Political Economy (CPE). While the achievements of the book in further shifting attention towards the constitutionalist perspective and providing a wide ranging discussion of the demand for rules are acknowledged, I suggest that the account of rules provided there and which still forms the core of much constitutionalist discussion in the Buchanan tradition seems limited. This paper revisits the analysis of rules in order to offer a broader perspective that is still consistent with the central ambitions of The Reason of Rules and CPE more generally. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014
Volume (Year): 25 (2014)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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