IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/copoec/v27y2016i4d10.1007_s10602-016-9225-7.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Native American reservation constitutions

Author

Listed:
  • R. Warren Anderson

    (University of Michigan-Dearborn)

Abstract

The Cherokees wrote a constitution in 1827; in contrast, the Yokuts tribe on the Santa Rosa Rancheria Reservation adopted theirs in 2014. As Native American tribal constitutions are common, I examine determinants of establishing these written constitutions. During their formation, some reservations had bands of the same tribe forced onto the same land. These reservations of forced coexistence wrote constitutions at an earlier date. More homogeneous, centralized tribes tended to adopt their constitutions at a later date, although this finding is less robust. The implication is that coordination costs were less than the benefits from constraining a potential rival band, and that social norms of centralization made having a written constitution less necessary. Additionally, a positive correlation is found between having a written constitution and economic output, similar to other studies.

Suggested Citation

  • R. Warren Anderson, 2016. "Native American reservation constitutions," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 377-398, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:27:y:2016:i:4:d:10.1007_s10602-016-9225-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-016-9225-7
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10602-016-9225-7
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10602-016-9225-7?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lorenz Blume & Jens Müller & Stefan Voigt & Carsten Wolf, 2009. "The economic effects of constitutions: replicating—and extending—Persson and Tabellini," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(1), pages 197-225, April.
    2. Alvaro Montenegro, 1995. "Constitutional design and economic performance," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 161-169, June.
    3. Terry L. Anderson & Dominic P. Parker, 2008. "Sovereignty, Credible Commitments, and Economic Prosperity on American Indian Reservations," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(4), pages 641-666, November.
    4. Christian Dippel, 2014. "Forced Coexistence and Economic Development: Evidence From Native American Reservations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82, pages 2131-2165, November.
    5. Cornell, Stephen & Kalt, Joseph P., 2000. "Where's the glue? Institutional and cultural foundations of American Indian economic development," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 443-470.
    6. Voigt, Stefan, 2009. "Explaining constitutional garrulity," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 290-303, December.
    7. James Buchanan, 1990. "The domain of constitutional economics," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-18, December.
    8. Christian Bjørnskov & Stefan Voigt, 2014. "Constitutional verbosity and social trust," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 161(1), pages 91-112, October.
    9. Alexander Tabarrok, 1994. "A Survey, Critique, and New Defense of Term Limits," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 14(2), pages 333-350, Fall.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Pavlik, Jamie Bologna & Jahan, Israt & Young, Andrew T., 2023. "Do longer constitutions corrupt?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    2. Donna Feir & Rob Gillezeau & Maggie E. C. Jones, 2019. "The Slaughter of the Bison and Reversal of Fortunes on the Great Plains," Center for Indian Country Development series 1-2019, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    3. Andrew T. Young, 2019. "How Austrians can contribute to constitutional political economy (and why they should)," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 32(4), pages 281-293, December.
    4. Donn Feir & Rob Gillezeau & Maggie Jones, 2017. "The Slaughter of the North American Bison and Reversal of Fortunes on the Great Plains," Department Discussion Papers 1701, Department of Economics, University of Victoria.
    5. Gregg, Matthew T., 2018. "The long-term effects of American Indian boarding schools," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 17-32.
    6. Frimpong Boamah, Emmanuel, 2018. "Constitutional economics of Ghana’s decentralization," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 256-267.
    7. Jerg Gutmann & Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska & Stefan Voigt, 2024. "The comparative constitutional compliance database," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 95-115, January.
    8. Justin Callais & Andrew T. Young, 2021. "Does constitutional entrenchment matter for economic freedom?," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 39(4), pages 808-830, October.
    9. Akee, Randall & Jorgensen, Miriam & Sunde, Uwe, 2015. "Critical junctures and economic development – Evidence from the adoption of constitutions among American Indian Nations," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(4), pages 844-861.
    10. Brown, James R. & Cookson, J. Anthony & Heimer, Rawley Z., 2019. "Growing up without finance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(3), pages 591-616.
    11. Maurizio Mistri, 2007. "Institutional changes and shifting ideas: a constitutional analysis of the Euro," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 107-126, June.
    12. Aragón, Fernando M., 2015. "Do better property rights improve local income?: Evidence from First Nations' treaties," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 43-56.
    13. Akee, Randall & Jorgensen, Miriam, 2014. "Property institutions and business investment on American Indian reservations," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 116-125.
    14. Leonard, Bryan & Parker, Dominic P. & Anderson, Terry L., 2020. "Land quality, land rights, and indigenous poverty," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
    15. Dimitrova-Grajzl, Valentina & Grajzl, Peter & Guse, A. Joseph & Todd, Richard M., 2015. "Consumer credit on American Indian reservations," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 518-540.
    16. Voigt, Stefan, 2009. "Explaining constitutional garrulity," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 290-303, December.
    17. Z A Spindler & X de Vanssay, 2002. "Constitutions And Economic Freedom," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 70(6), pages 1135-1147, September.
    18. George Crowley, 2012. "Spatial dependence in constitutional constraints: the case of US states," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 134-165, June.
    19. Valentina Dimitrova-Grajzl & Peter Grajzl & A. Joseph Guse & Richard M. Todd & Michael Williams, 2018. "Neighborhood Racial Characteristics, Credit History, and Bankcard Credit in Indian Country," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 60(3), pages 410-441, September.
    20. Justin Callais & Andrew T. Young, 2022. "Does rigidity matter? Constitutional entrenchment and growth," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 27-62, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Constitution; Reservation; Native American;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:27:y:2016:i:4:d:10.1007_s10602-016-9225-7. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.