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Valuing Tullock's Rejects: The Reception of His Work in Rent Seeking

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  • Gordon Brady

Abstract

Gordon Tullock's work in economics spans nearly 50 years and is known for the breadth, originality, and quantity of his contributions in public choice, constitutional political economy, law and economics, bioeconomics, and monetary history. Despite his lack of formal training in economics, Tullock published in major economic journals early in his career. A number of his papers, which proved to be seminal to the theory of rent seeking, were rejected by top economic journals. This paper explores possible reasons for the editor's reception to Tullock's work and uses citation counts to value Tullock's rejected papers. My paper shows that Tullock's work continues to be cited, often far more frequently than the papers which journals chose to publish when they rejected Tullock's submissions. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2005

Suggested Citation

  • Gordon Brady, 2005. "Valuing Tullock's Rejects: The Reception of His Work in Rent Seeking," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 33(4), pages 473-483, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:33:y:2005:i:4:p:473-483
    DOI: 10.1007/s11293-005-2878-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Buchanan, James M & Tullock, Gordon, 1975. "Polluters' Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls Versus Taxes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(1), pages 139-147, March.
    2. Abram Bergson, 1967. "Market Socialism Revisited," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 75, pages 655-655.
    3. Robert D. Tollison, 1982. "Rent Seeking: A Survey," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(4), pages 575-602, November.
    4. Harvey Leibenstein, 1975. "Aspects of the X-Efficiency Theory of the Firm," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 6(2), pages 580-606, Autumn.
    5. Joshua S. Gans & George B. Shepherd, 1994. "How Are the Mighty Fallen: Rejected Classic Articles by Leading Economists," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 165-179, Winter.
    6. Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 807-827, August.
    7. Bhagwati, Jagdish N. & Brecher, Richard A. & Srinivasan, T. N., 1984. "DUP activities and economic theory," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 291-307, April.
    8. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
    9. Bailey, Duncan & Schotta, Charles, 1972. "Private and Social Rates of Return to Education of Academicians," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(1), pages 19-31, March.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    B25; B29; B30; B31;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B25 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Austrian; Stockholm School
    • B29 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Other
    • B30 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought: Individuals - - - General
    • B31 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought: Individuals - - - Individuals

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