Central bank policy making in competing payment systems
This paper analyzes the interaction between two payment systems. Administrators of both systems establish intraday credit interest fees, caps, and collateral requirements. Analysis of the model indicates that if a central bank does not take into account the effects that its policies have on its share of payment system transactions, then its efforts to contain risks associated with daylight overdrafts on its wire system will require a loss in its share of total transactions volume. If it does recognize the potential loss in its share of payments, then socially optimal policy instrument settings are unlikely to emerge. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2000
Volume (Year): 28 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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