Property Assessments and Information Asymmetry in Residential Real Estate
This paper presents a game theoretic model of property tax assessment that allows a tax appraiser to either choose a high or a low assessment. The owner either accepts or challenges this assessment. A â€˜â€˜fixed effectsâ€™â€™ regression model is used to evaluate the differences in the assessed values of a sample of houses from Bexar County, Texas during 2000 and 2001. Where the owner of the house is identified as a state licensed property tax consultant, the assessed value, after adjusting for size, age, and other economic characteristics, ranged from a statistically robust 2.5% to 6.2% lower than neighboring houses.
Volume (Year): 28 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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