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Information Externalities: A Further Note on the Market Provision of National Defense

Author

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  • Garrett R. Wood

    (Virginia Wesleyan University)

Abstract

Markets suffer from a free-rider problem in the provision of national defense, but offense also suffers from a free-rider problem. An opportunistic country may attempt to capture the spoils generated by another country’s offensive efforts, or other countries may freely enjoy the satisfaction of seeing a hated enemy defeated by a country that pays for an offensive against it. Offense also generates a previously unconsidered benefit for free-riders in the form of valuable information about the capabilities of the offense and defense, and the scale of this benefit is increasing with technological and economic advancement around the world.

Suggested Citation

  • Garrett R. Wood, 2023. "Information Externalities: A Further Note on the Market Provision of National Defense," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 38(1), pages 71-75.
  • Handle: RePEc:jpe:journl:1935
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fearon, James D., 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(3), pages 379-414, July.
    2. repec:jpe:journl:1284 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. repec:jpe:journl:1286 is not listed on IDEAS
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    JEL classification:

    • F52 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - National Security; Economic Nationalism
    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
    • H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General

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