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Export Jobs, Special Interest Groups, and the US Presidential Election of 2016: The Case of West Virginia

Author

Listed:
  • Tomi Ovaska

    (Youngstown State University)

  • Ryo Takashima

    (Sophia University)

Abstract

In this West Virginia case study, we highlight the success of traditional, small special interest groups in the 2016 US presidential election and demonstrate through county-level export-data regression analysis how the grip of small import-competing groups in West Virginia is loosening in a globalizing world. We show how the previously successful anti-import groups now face new small producer and consumer groups that are also well organized and whose income depends on open trade. Using graphical analysis, we also show that when the anti-import groups lose relative standing, society’s deadweight loss caused by trade restraints gets increasingly smaller. __________________________________________________________

Suggested Citation

  • Tomi Ovaska & Ryo Takashima, 2019. "Export Jobs, Special Interest Groups, and the US Presidential Election of 2016: The Case of West Virginia," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 34(4), pages 75-97.
  • Handle: RePEc:jpe:journl:1632
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General
    • F69 - International Economics - - Economic Impacts of Globalization - - - Other
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies

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