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Contracts Without Government

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  • Peter T. Leeson

    (George Mason University)

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  • Peter T. Leeson, 2003. "Contracts Without Government," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 18(Spring 20), pages 35-54.
    • Handle: RePEc:jpe:journl:144
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Greif, Avner, 1989. "Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 857-882, December.
    2. Hoffman, Elizabeth & McCabe, Kevin & Smith, Vernon L, 1996. "Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 653-660, June.
    3. Yoram Barzel, 1997. "Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets," Chapters, in: Svetozar Pejovich (ed.), The Economic Foundations of Property Rights, chapter 13, pages 171-192, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Hay, Jonathan R & Shleifer, Andrei, 1998. "Private Enforcement of Public Laws: A Theory of Legal Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 398-403, May.
    5. Benson, Bruce L, 1995. "An Exploration of the Impact of Modern Arbitration Statutes on the Development of Arbitration in the United States," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 479-501, October.
    6. Michihiro Kandori, 1992. "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(1), pages 63-80.
    7. Landa, Janet T., 1983. "The enigma of the kula ring: Gift-exchanges and primitive law and order," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 137-160, December.
    8. Vernon L. Smith, 1998. "The Two Faces of Adam Smith," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(1), pages 2-19, July.
    9. Bryan Caplan & Edward Stringham, 2003. "Networks, Law, and the Paradox of Cooperation," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 16(4), pages 309-326, December.
    10. Clive Bull, 1987. "The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(1), pages 147-159.
    11. Bernstein, Lisa, 1992. "Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 115-157, January.
    12. Andrzej Rapaczynski, 1996. "The Roles of the State and the Market in Establishing Property Rights," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 87-103, Spring.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Peter Boettke, 2012. "An anarchist’s reflection on the political economy of everyday life," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 25(1), pages 1-7, March.
    2. Peter Leeson, 2008. "Coordination without command: Stretching the scope of spontaneous order," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 135(1), pages 67-78, April.
    3. Boettke Peter J. & Coyne Christopher J. & Leeson Peter T., 2004. "The Many Faces of the Market," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 14(2), pages 1-18, December.
    4. Peter Leeson & Christopher Coyne & Peter Boettke, 2006. "Converting social conflict: Focal points and the evolution of cooperation," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 19(2), pages 137-147, June.

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