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The Different Impacts Of Different Types Of Natural Resources On Political Institutions In Developing Countries

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  • MICHAEL GOUJON AND ARISTIDE MABALI

    (CERDI, CNRS-University of Auvergne)

Abstract

Rents generated by natural resources are usually thought to weaken the quality of institutions, particularly in developing countries. Our hypothesis is that this effect may differ depending on the types of natural resources characterized by their different degree of appropriability. We test this hypothesis using panel data covering 90 developing countries for the period 1970-2010. We find that total rents weaken the quality of institutions. However, while oil rents have a significant negative effect, forest and mineral rents do not, after controlling for the other relevant determinants of institutional quality, institutional persistence, neighbor effect, and endogeneity of rents.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Goujon And Aristide Mabali, 2016. "The Different Impacts Of Different Types Of Natural Resources On Political Institutions In Developing Countries," Journal of Economic Development, Chung-Ang Unviersity, Department of Economics, vol. 41(3), pages 1-20, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:jed:journl:v:41:y:2016:i:3:p:1-20
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    Cited by:

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    2. Oumarou Zallé, 2022. "Natural Resource Dependence, Corruption, and Tax Revenue Mobilization," Journal of Economic Integration, Center for Economic Integration, Sejong University, vol. 37(2), pages 316-336.

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    JEL classification:

    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
    • Q34 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts
    • C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models

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