Optimal Bidding in the Mexican Treasury Securities Primary Auctions: Results of a Structural Econometric Approach
This analysis of the Mexican Treasury securities primary auctions suggests that the uniform format yields higher revenues than the discriminatory format. It applies the structural econometric model proposed by Février, Préget, and Visser (2004). This mod
Volume (Year): 45 (2008)
Issue (Month): 131 ()
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- Philippe Février & Raphaële Preget & Michael Visser, 2002. "Econometrics of Share Auctions," Working Papers 2002-09, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
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