From Security to Mobility: Generalized Investments in Human Capital and Agent Commitment

This paper considers the impacts of different investments in human capital (firm-specific versus generalized investments) on employee commitment to the firm. The resource-based literature has stressed that only firm-specific human capital is likely to generate organizational rents, since those assets are more likely to be inimitable, rare, and therefore a better basis for sustained competitive advantage. Generalized investments in human capital (i.e., investments in capabilities that people can transfer and deploy to other firms or settings) are to be avoided. However, observing lessons from the literature on psychological contracts and organizational commitment, we argue that generalized investments may have value for the firm through their effects on worker commitment to the firm. The gain in worker commitment is valuable to firms given the fragile state of the contemporary employment relation, in which the lack of job security is likely to breed diminished employee commitment. This is particularly a concern for employment relations consisting of externalized labor (i.e., contract work or selfemployed professionals operating as agents of the firm), in which agent commitment is vital but likely to be more scarce. In this paper we focus on the externalized workers (independent agents) of two insurance firms in addressing these issues. A sample of 237 agents shows support for the benefits of generalized investments on agent commitment, questioning conventional wisdom that such investments should be avoided. We also examine the impact of relation-specific investments and other key antecedents on agent commitment, concluding that a mixture of strategic investments in human capital should be considered, taking into account their impacts on the firm-worker psychological contract. We also examine the impact of agent commitment on agent performance in this context, finding committed agents do provide greater value to the insurer.