IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/inm/ormsom/v26y2024i1p312-329.html

Quick Response Under Strategic Manufacturer

Author

Listed:
  • Jiguang Chen

    (School of Management, Xiamen University, Xiamen, Fujian 361005, China; Center for Accounting Studies, Xiamen University, Xiamen, Fujian 361005, China)

  • Qiying Hu

    (School of Management, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China)

  • Duo Shi

    (School of Management and Economics, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen, Shenzhen, Guangdong 518172, China; Shenzhen Finance Institute, Shenzhen, Guangdong 518000, China)

  • Fuqiang Zhang

    (Olin Business School, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, Missouri 63130)

Abstract

Problem definition : Quick response is a classic operations strategy that allows a retailer to place a rapid replenishment order during the selling season using information learned from early sales. The benefits of quick response are widely studied in the literature under the condition that the manufacturer’s wholesale prices are exogenously given. Motivated by the practice of emerging small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) fashion brands, this paper revisits the value of quick response for a retailer when a manufacturer can strategically set its wholesale prices. Methodology/results : We develop a game-theoretic model consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. In contrast to the traditional quick response setting, the manufacturer can dynamically adjust wholesale prices for both regular and replenishment orders. First, we investigate whether and when quick response still benefits the retailer. We find that, under low or significantly high demand uncertainties, the firms share a common preferred ordering strategy, and quick response benefits the retailer as well as the supply chain. But, under moderately high demand uncertainty, the retailer’s favored ordering strategy conflicts with the manufacturer’s interest; as a result, the manufacturer would set wholesale prices to counter the retailer’s ordering strategy, which makes quick response detrimental to the retailer. Second, we search for mechanisms that can resolve this conflict and restore the beneficial effect of quick response. We show that letting the manufacturer commit to wholesale prices up front is ineffective in fixing the problem. However, if the retailer can propose a take-it-or-leave-it wholesale price for the replenishment order (possibly with the replenishment quantity) once the regular wholesale price is set, then quick response leads to a win–win outcome for both firms. Managerial implications : The findings caution retailers with weak power (e.g., SMEs) when adopting quick response, especially when facing moderately high demand uncertainties. The retailer, although weak, should be aware of the retailer’s natural ability to propose replenishment terms because, otherwise, the retailer can always forgo quick response; this opens up an opportunity to design more favorable arrangements.

Suggested Citation

  • Jiguang Chen & Qiying Hu & Duo Shi & Fuqiang Zhang, 2024. "Quick Response Under Strategic Manufacturer," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 26(1), pages 312-329, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormsom:v:26:y:2024:i:1:p:312-329
    DOI: 10.1287/msom.2021.0561
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/msom.2021.0561
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1287/msom.2021.0561?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gérard P. Cachon & Robert Swinney, 2009. "Purchasing, Pricing, and Quick Response in the Presence of Strategic Consumers," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(3), pages 497-511, March.
    2. Liang Guo & Ganesh Iyer, 2010. "Information Acquisition and Sharing in a Vertical Relationship," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 29(3), pages 483-506, 05-06.
    3. Anil Arya & Hans Frimor & Brian Mittendorf, 2015. "Decentralized Procurement in Light of Strategic Inventories," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(3), pages 578-585, March.
    4. Sherif Nasser & Danko Turcic, 2016. "To Commit or Not to Commit: Revisiting Quantity vs. Price Competition in a Differentiated Industry," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(6), pages 1719-1733, June.
    5. Ganesh Iyer & Chakravarthi Narasimhan & Rakesh Niraj, 2007. "Information and Inventory in Distribution Channels," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(10), pages 1551-1561, October.
    6. Gérard P. Cachon & Robert Swinney, 2011. "The Value of Fast Fashion: Quick Response, Enhanced Design, and Strategic Consumer Behavior," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(4), pages 778-795, April.
    7. Robin Hartwig & Karl Inderfurth & Abdolkarim Sadrieh & Guido Voigt, 2015. "Strategic Inventory and Supply Chain Behavior," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 24(8), pages 1329-1345, August.
    8. Liang Guo, 2009. "The Benefits of Downstream Information Acquisition," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 28(3), pages 457-471, 05-06.
    9. Rajiv Lal & John D. C. Little & J. Miguel Villas-Boas, 1996. "A Theory of Forward Buying, Merchandising, and Trade Deals," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 15(1), pages 21-37.
    10. Tony Haitao Cui & Jagmohan S. Raju & Z. John Zhang, 2008. "A Price Discrimination Model of Trade Promotions," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 27(5), pages 779-795, 09-10.
    11. Yossi Aviv & Mike Mingcheng Wei & Fuqiang Zhang, 2019. "Responsive Pricing of Fashion Products: The Effects of Demand Learning and Strategic Consumer Behavior," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(7), pages 2982-3000, July.
    12. Abhishek Roy & Stephen M. Gilbert & Guoming Lai, 2019. "The Implications of Visibility on the Use of Strategic Inventory in a Supply Chain," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(4), pages 1752-1767, April.
    13. Zhan Qu & Horst Raff, 2021. "Vertical Contracts in a Supply Chain and the Bullwhip Effect," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(6), pages 3744-3756, June.
    14. Kinshuk Jerath & Sang-Hyun Kim & Robert Swinney, 2017. "Product Quality in a Distribution Channel with Inventory Risk," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 36(5), pages 747-761, September.
    15. Krishnan Anand & Ravi Anupindi & Yehuda Bassok, 2008. "Strategic Inventories in Vertical Contracts," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(10), pages 1792-1804, October.
    16. Xuanming Su & Fuqiang Zhang, 2009. "On the Value of Commitment and Availability Guarantees When Selling to Strategic Consumers," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(5), pages 713-726, May.
    17. Giovanni Maggi, 1999. "The Value of Commitment with Imperfect Observability and Private Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(4), pages 555-574, Winter.
    18. Harish Krishnan & Roman Kapuscinski & David A. Butz, 2010. "Quick Response and Retailer Effort," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 56(6), pages 962-977, June.
    19. Jiri Chod & Nils Rudi, 2005. "Resource Flexibility with Responsive Pricing," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 53(3), pages 532-548, June.
    20. Ananth. V. Iyer & Mark E. Bergen, 1997. "Quick Response in Manufacturer-Retailer Channels," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 43(4), pages 559-570, April.
    21. Xu Guan & Ying-Ju Chen, 2017. "The Interplay between Information Acquisition and Quality Disclosure," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 26(3), pages 389-408, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Yanjun Wang & Yiming Fan, 2025. "Product quantity and supplier format choice under platform information sharing," Operations Management Research, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 1167-1192, December.
    2. Chu, Mingsen & Wang, Yusheng & Li, Yongjian, 2026. "Co-opetition strategies of retail platform operations with strategic consumers," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 329(3), pages 935-949.
    3. Yang, Rui & Feng, Lin & Zhang, Jianxiong & Song, Zhuzhu, 2025. "Conflicts and cooperation: New product development or co-development in a supply chain," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Lezhen Wu & Xiaole Wu & Yu Zhou, 2023. "Commitment strategies and inventory decisions under supply disruption risk," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 32(8), pages 2619-2637, August.
    2. Xi Li & Krista J. Li & Yan Xiong, 2023. "Channel Coordination of Storable Goods," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 42(3), pages 538-550, May.
    3. Wang, Zeming & Veldman, Jasper & Teunter, Ruud, 2026. "Strategic inventories under the reference price effect," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 330(3), pages 914-924.
    4. Sherif Nasser & Danko Turcic, 2019. "Temporary Contract Adjustment to a Retailer with a Private Demand Forecast," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(1), pages 209-229, January.
    5. QU, Zhan & RAFF, Horst, 2023. "Two-part tariffs, inventory stockpiling, and the bullwhip effect," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 308(1), pages 201-214.
    6. Ma, Chenglin & Pun, Hubert & Zhao, Ruiqing, 2026. "Strategic inventory of original products amid new product launches," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 329(3), pages 878-889.
    7. Xiaoyang Long & Javad Nasiry, 2022. "Sustainability in the Fast Fashion Industry," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 24(3), pages 1276-1293, May.
    8. Guan, Xu & Huang, Song & Chen, Ying-Ju, 2022. "Acquisition transparency and induced supplier encroachment," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
    9. Baojun Jiang & Lin Tian, 2022. "Effects of Reactive Capacity on Product Quality and Firm Profitability in an Uncertain Market," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 70(5), pages 2619-2636, September.
    10. Mustafa O. Kabul & Ali K. Parlaktürk, 2019. "The Value of Commitments When Selling to Strategic Consumers: A Supply Chain Perspective," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(10), pages 4754-4770, October.
    11. Jiahua Zhang & Lian Qi & Shilu Tong, 2021. "Dynamic Contract under Quick Response in a Supply Chain with Information Asymmetry," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(5), pages 1273-1289, May.
    12. Kinshuk Jerath & Sang-Hyun Kim & Robert Swinney, 2017. "Product Quality in a Distribution Channel with Inventory Risk," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 36(5), pages 747-761, September.
    13. Robert Swinney, 2011. "Selling to Strategic Consumers When Product Value Is Uncertain: The Value of Matching Supply and Demand," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(10), pages 1737-1751, October.
    14. Dong, Junfeng & Wu, Desheng Dash, 2019. "Two-period pricing and quick response with strategic customers," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 215(C), pages 165-173.
    15. Lang Xiong & Tingting Xiao & Fuhai Nie, 2022. "Group Buying of Competing Retailers with Strategic Inventory," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(20), pages 1-18, October.
    16. Chen, Yan & Fang, Yanli & Kuo, Yong-Hong, 2024. "Demand cannibalization during product rollovers in the presence of strategic customers," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 192(C).
    17. Yang, Xi & Dai, Bin & Xie, Xia, 2024. "Supplier encroachment strategies in a retail platform with strategic inventory holding behavior," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
    18. You Zhao & Jianxin Chen & Ping Shi & Rui Hou, 2024. "The value of information acquisition and sharing on an online intermediary platform," Electronic Commerce Research, Springer, vol. 24(4), pages 2849-2875, December.
    19. Tong, Yang & Lu, Tao & Li, Yina & Ye, Fei, 2023. "Encroachment by a better-informed manufacturer," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 305(3), pages 1113-1129.
    20. Abhishek Roy & Stephen M. Gilbert & Guoming Lai, 2022. "The Implications of Strategic Inventory for Short-Term vs. Long-Term Supply Contracts in Nonexclusive Reselling Environments," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 24(5), pages 2629-2647, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:inm:ormsom:v:26:y:2024:i:1:p:312-329. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Asher (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/inforea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.