IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/inm/ormsom/v24y2022i5p2629-2647.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Implications of Strategic Inventory for Short-Term vs. Long-Term Supply Contracts in Nonexclusive Reselling Environments

Author

Listed:
  • Abhishek Roy

    (Department of Statistics, Operations, and Data Science, Fox School of Business, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19122)

  • Stephen M. Gilbert

    (Department of Information, Risk, and Operations Management, McCombs School of Business, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas 78712)

  • Guoming Lai

    (Department of Information, Risk, and Operations Management, McCombs School of Business, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas 78712)

Abstract

Problem definition : Although it is well known that a reseller’s ability to hold strategic inventory under a short-term supply contract can potentially benefit both the reseller and a supplier, existing research on strategic inventory focuses almost exclusively on exclusive reselling environments. However, in practice, multiple suppliers often sell to the same nonexclusive reseller, and it is not uncommon for suppliers to ask for future commitments to order quantities from resellers in return for their own commitment to wholesale prices. We investigate how the possibility of strategic inventory influences competing suppliers’ choices between short-term transactional and long-term commitment contracts to a nonexclusive reseller. Methodology/results : Using a game-theoretic model, we consider the interactions between two partially substitutable suppliers and a single, nonexclusive reseller over a two-period horizon in which demand is deterministic. We demonstrate that in nonexclusive reselling environments, where more than one supplier sells its product through the same reseller, the use of strategic inventory under short-term contracts intensifies the price competition between suppliers. We show how this effect can be mitigated when one or both suppliers offer a long-term contract. Moreover, we show that long-term contracts can arise as an equilibrium outcome, particularly when products are more substitutable or holding costs are large. Managerial implications : By considering the interactions between two partially substitutable suppliers and a nonexclusive reseller in a multiperiod setting, we contribute to the literature on strategic contracting and long versus short-term contracts. Our research provides managers with a new explanation, beyond the need to encourage idiosyncratic investments or eliminate the possibility of hold-up, for why long-term contracts may benefit suppliers in practice, who face competition while selling through a nonexclusive reseller.

Suggested Citation

  • Abhishek Roy & Stephen M. Gilbert & Guoming Lai, 2022. "The Implications of Strategic Inventory for Short-Term vs. Long-Term Supply Contracts in Nonexclusive Reselling Environments," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 24(5), pages 2629-2647, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormsom:v:24:y:2022:i:5:p:2629-2647
    DOI: 10.1287/msom.2022.1114
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.1114
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1287/msom.2022.1114?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:inm:ormsom:v:24:y:2022:i:5:p:2629-2647. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Asher (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/inforea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.