IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/inm/ormsom/v24y2022i1p524-541.html

Extended Producer Responsibility for Pharmaceuticals

Author

Listed:
  • Işıl Alev

    (Carroll School of Management, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts 02467)

  • Atalay Atasu

    (INSEAD, Boulevard de Constance, 77300 Fontainebleau, France; Scheller College of Business, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia 30332)

  • L. Beril Toktay

    (Scheller College of Business, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia 30332)

  • Can Zhang

    (Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708)

Abstract

Problem definition : We investigate the effectiveness of different extended producer responsibility (EPR) implementation models for pharmaceuticals. In particular, we study two viable and prevalent models: (1) source reduction (SR), where a form of fee on sale is imposed on producers, and (2) end-of-pipe control (EC), where producers are made responsible for the collection of unused pharmaceuticals. Academic/practical relevance : The existing literature on EPR implementation models has focused primarily on nonconsumable products (e.g., electronics), whereas there is limited research on the effectiveness of different EPR implementation models for pharmaceuticals used in practice. We aim to fill this gap in this study. Methodology : We develop a game-theoretic model to characterize the equilibrium strategies of different stakeholders under both the SR and EC models and compare the resulting producer profit, environmental/social impact, and total welfare. Results : In contrast to the nonconsumable contexts where the SR model is shown to maximize total welfare, the EC model leads to a higher total welfare for certain categories of pharmaceuticals because of its effectiveness in eliminating overprescription. Moreover, we characterize conditions under which stakeholder (e.g., producer, environmental/social advocacy groups) preferences toward EPR implementation model choices are (mis-)aligned. We further show that limiting the social planner’s budget surplus under SR can eliminate the preference misalignment but leads to a loss of total welfare. Managerial implications : (1) Policymakers should be cautious about directly applying preferred EPR models from other product categories to the pharmaceutical setting. (2) The EC model maximizes the objectives of all stakeholders for a salient category of pharmaceuticals with high health benefits, high collection costs, and high environmental/social costs. (3) Policymakers should give thought to differentiating EPR implementation models across pharmaceutical categories. (4) It is important to carefully quantify the health impact of the pharmaceuticals and the operational cost parameters to inform policymaking.

Suggested Citation

  • Işıl Alev & Atalay Atasu & L. Beril Toktay & Can Zhang, 2022. "Extended Producer Responsibility for Pharmaceuticals," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 24(1), pages 524-541, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormsom:v:24:y:2022:i:1:p:524-541
    DOI: 10.1287/msom.2020.0962
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/msom.2020.0962
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1287/msom.2020.0962?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Blomqvist, Ake, 1991. "The doctor as double agent: Information asymmetry, health insurance, and medical care," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 411-432.
    2. Kris De Jaegher & Marc Jegers, 2001. "The physician–patient relationship as a game of strategic information transmission," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 10(7), pages 651-668, October.
    3. Bhattacharya, Jayanta & Vogt, William B, 2003. "A Simple Model of Pharmaceutical Price Dynamics," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(2), pages 599-626, October.
    4. Xiaojing Dong & Pradeep Chintagunta & Puneet Manchanda, 2011. "A new multivariate count data model to study multi-category physician prescription behavior," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 301-337, September.
    5. Philippe Choné & Ching-To Albert Ma, 2011. "Optimal Health Care Contract under Physician Agency," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 101-102, pages 229-256.
    6. Ximin (Natalie) Huang & Atalay Atasu & L. Beril Toktay, 2019. "Design Implications of Extended Producer Responsibility for Durable Products," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(6), pages 2573-2590, June.
    7. Chan, David Chimin & Avorn, Jerry Lewis & Solomon, Daniel Hal & Brookhart, Alan & Choudhry, Niteesh K & Cutler, David M. & Jan, Saira & Fischer, Michael Adam & Liu, Jun & Shrank, William H., 2010. "Patient, Physician, and Payment Predictors of Statin Adherence," Scholarly Articles 5343023, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    8. Erica Plambeck & Qiong Wang, 2009. "Effects of E-Waste Regulation on New Product Introduction," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(3), pages 333-347, March.
    9. repec:adr:anecst:y:2011:i:101-102:p:11 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. James Lomas & Alexis Llewellyn & Marta Soares & Mark Simmonds & Kath Wright & Alison Eastwood & Stephen Palmer, 2016. "The Clinical and Cost Effectiveness of Vortioxetine for the Treatment of a Major Depressive Episode in Patients With Failed Prior Antidepressant Therapy: A Critique of the Evidence," PharmacoEconomics, Springer, vol. 34(9), pages 901-912, September.
    11. Walls, Margaret, 2003. "The Role of Economics in Extended Producer Responsibility: Making Policy Choices and Setting Policy Goals," RFF Working Paper Series dp-03-11, Resources for the Future.
    12. Dranove David & Spier Kathryn E., 2003. "A Theory of Utilization Review," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-19, August.
    13. Dranove, David, 1988. "Demand Inducement and the Physician/Patient Relationship," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 26(2), pages 281-298, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Zhao, Zhiying & Lan, Yanfei & Xu, Shuxian & Zou, Hongyang & Du, Huibin, 2024. "Addressing the reliability challenge: Subsidy policies for promoting renewable electricity consumption," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    2. Erdmann, Maximilian Vincent & Walkowitz, Gari, 2025. "Testing eco-modulation policy incentives: Experimental evidence on extended producer responsibility," MPRA Paper 126860, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Niloofar Gilani Larimi & Adel Guitouni & Belaid Moa & Jens H. Weber & Andre Kushniruk, 2026. "Toward resilient and sustainable healthcare supply chains: a scoping review and framework," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 358(3), pages 1361-1423, March.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Yu Xia & Jing Li & Zhongyang Zhang, 2023. "Effects of price cap regulation on pharmaceutical supply chain under the zero markup drug policy," Operational Research, Springer, vol. 23(4), pages 1-27, December.
    2. K.J.M. De Jaegher, 2012. "The value of private information in the physician-patient relationship: a gametheoretic account," Working Papers 12-23, Utrecht School of Economics.
    3. Luyi Gui & Atalay Atasu & Özlem Ergun & L. Beril Toktay, 2016. "Efficient Implementation of Collective Extended Producer Responsibility Legislation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(4), pages 1098-1123, April.
    4. Blomqvist, Ake & Leger, Pierre Thomas, 2005. "Information asymmetry, insurance, and the decision to hospitalize," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 775-793, July.
    5. Morvarid Rahmani & Luyi Gui & Atalay Atasu, 2021. "The Implications of Recycling Technology Choice on Extended Producer Responsibility," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(2), pages 522-542, February.
    6. Marie Allard & Pierre Thomas Léger & Lise Rochaix, 2009. "Provider Competition in a Dynamic Setting," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(2), pages 457-486, June.
    7. Felix C.H. Gottschalk, 2019. "Why prevent when it does not pay? Prevention when health services are credence goods," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(5), pages 693-709, May.
    8. Rosella LEVAGGI & Lise ROCHAIX, 2007. "Exit, Choice Or Loyalty: Patient Driven Competition In Primary Care," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 78(4), pages 501-535, December.
    9. Jin, Minyue & Li, Baoyong & Chen, Xiaoxu & Feng, Lipan, 2024. "The bright and dark sides of servitization under extended producer responsibility," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 278(C).
    10. Chen Jin & Luyi Yang & Cungen Zhu, 2023. "Right to Repair: Pricing, Welfare, and Environmental Implications," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(2), pages 1017-1036, February.
    11. Anusua Datta & Dhaval Dave, 2017. "Effects of Physician‐directed Pharmaceutical Promotion on Prescription Behaviors: Longitudinal Evidence," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(4), pages 450-468, April.
    12. Bertrand Crettez & Régis Deloche & Marie‐Hélène Jeanneret‐Crettez, 2020. "A demand‐induced overtreatment model with heterogeneous experts," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(5), pages 1713-1733, September.
    13. Chen, Alice & Lakdawalla, Darius N., 2019. "Healing the poor: The influence of patient socioeconomic status on physician supply responses," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 43-54.
    14. Paul Calcott, 1999. "Demand inducement as cheap talk," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 8(8), pages 721-733, December.
    15. Pau Olivella, 2024. "Asymmetric information in health economics: Can contract regulation improve equity and efficiency?," Chapters, in: Daphne R. Raban & Julia Włodarczyk (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Information Economics, chapter 8, pages 154-169, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    16. Cai, Ya-Jun & Choi, Tsan-Ming & Feng, Lipan & Li, Yongjian, 2022. "Producer's choice of design-for-environment under environmental taxation," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 297(2), pages 532-544.
    17. Fei Gao & Shiliang Cui & Morris Cohen, 2021. "Performance, Reliability, or Time‐to‐Market? Innovative Product Development and the Impact of Government Regulation," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(1), pages 253-275, January.
    18. Qixiang Wang & Xiaobo Wang, 2022. "Does Product Eco-design Promote Remanufacturing: Application of a Stylized Game-theoretic Model," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(1), pages 1-20, December.
    19. Bin Xie & David M. Dilts & Mikhael Shor, 2006. "The physician–patient relationship: the impact of patient‐obtained medical information," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(8), pages 813-833, August.
    20. Barigozzi, Francesca & Levaggi, Rosella, 2008. "Emotions in physician agency," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 1-14, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:inm:ormsom:v:24:y:2022:i:1:p:524-541. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Asher (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/inforea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.