IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/inm/ormnsc/v68y2022i1p654-668.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A Theory of Assurance: Balancing Costly Formal Control with Tone at the Top

Author

Listed:
  • Mark Penno

    (Tippie College of Business, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa 52242)

Abstract

Informal tone at the top (TATT) is widely regarded as a fundamental ingredient of organizational control, yet because of its soft nature, the scholarship on TATT has not emphasized mathematical modeling. Observing that TATT refers to the example set by top management, I model TATT as, ceteris paribus, reflecting the expectation that the chief executive officer (CEO) will not divert organizational resources for personal benefit. The setting assumes that CEOs are randomly drawn from a labor pool containing candidates who either value career prospects (high type) or who do not value career prospects (low type). The fear of dismissal and a damaged career mean that high types tend to be less opportunistic than low types, who divert for personal gain. Contrary to the belief that trust and vulnerability go hand in hand, I identify conditions where TATT and optimal costly formal controls are complements. But I also show in the same setting that TATT and optimal formal controls can be substitutes. The results also explain why high levels of TATT may not be welcomed by the external auditor or certain stakeholders and explain ambiguous Sarbanes-Oxley reports.

Suggested Citation

  • Mark Penno, 2022. "A Theory of Assurance: Balancing Costly Formal Control with Tone at the Top," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(1), pages 654-668, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:68:y:2022:i:1:p:654-668
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2020.3861
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3861
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3861?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Shleifer, Andrei & Wolfenzon, Daniel, 2002. "Investor protection and equity markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 3-27, October.
    2. Ali, Ashiq & Zhang, Weining, 2015. "CEO tenure and earnings management," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 60-79.
    3. Graham, John R. & Grennan, Jillian & Harvey, Campbell R. & Rajgopal, Shivaram, 2022. "Corporate culture: Evidence from the field," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 552-593.
    4. Zhang, Ivy Xiying, 2007. "Economic consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(1-2), pages 74-115, September.
    5. Diamond, Douglas W, 1989. "Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 828-862, August.
    6. Dan Weiss, 2014. "Internal Controls in Family-Owned Firms," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(3), pages 463-482, September.
    7. Sarah C. Rice & David P. Weber, 2012. "How Effective Is Internal Control Reporting under SOX 404? Determinants of the (Non‐)Disclosure of Existing Material Weaknesses," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(3), pages 811-843, June.
    8. Michael Kosfeld & Armin Falk, 2006. "The Hidden Costs of Control," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1611-1630, December.
    9. Iván Marinovic, 2013. "Internal control system, earnings quality, and the dynamics of financial reporting," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(1), pages 145-167, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Marc Berninger & Markus Klug & Dirk Schiereck, 2018. "Börsenrückzüge infolge steigender Corporate-Governance-Anforderungen – Empirische Evidenz von 13 europäischen Kapitalmärkten [Delistings due to Increased Corporate Governance Requirements – Empiric," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 70(4), pages 351-391, December.
    2. Bruno, Valentina & Claessens, Stijn, 2010. "Corporate governance and regulation: Can there be too much of a good thing?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 461-482, October.
    3. Srinidhi, Bin & Liao, Qunfeng, 2020. "Family firms and crash risk: Alignment and entrenchment effects," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2).
    4. Oliver Entrop & Matthias F. Merkel, 2020. "Managers’ research education, the use of FX derivatives and corporate speculation," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 869-901, August.
    5. Dan Amiram & Zahn Bozanic & James D. Cox & Quentin Dupont & Jonathan M. Karpoff & Richard Sloan, 2018. "Financial reporting fraud and other forms of misconduct: a multidisciplinary review of the literature," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 732-783, June.
    6. Legoria, Joseph & Rosa, Gina & Soileau, Jared S., 2017. "Audit quality across non-audit service fee benchmarks: Evidence from material weakness opinions," Research in Accounting Regulation, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 97-108.
    7. Barros, Victor & Guedes, Maria João & Santos, Pedro & Sarmento, Joaquim Miranda, 2022. "Does CEO turnover influence dividend policy?," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 44(C).
    8. Chalmers, Keryn & Hay, David & Khlif, Hichem, 2019. "Internal control in accounting research: A review," Journal of Accounting Literature, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 80-103.
    9. Hari P. Adhikari & Marcin W. Krolikowski & James Malm & Nilesh B. Sah, 2021. "Working capital (mis)management – impact of executive age," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 61(1), pages 727-761, March.
    10. Muttakin, Mohammad Badrul & Khan, Arifur & Tanewski, George, 2019. "CFO tenure, CFO board membership and accounting conservatism," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3).
    11. Andrade, Sandro C. & Bernile, Gennaro & Hood, Frederick M., 2014. "SOX, corporate transparency, and the cost of debt," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 145-165.
    12. Alexandridis, George & Chen, Zhong & Zeng, Yeqin, 2021. "Financial hedging and corporate investment," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    13. Corina Burunciuc & Halit Gonenc, 2020. "Reforms Protecting Minority Shareholders and Firm Performance: International Evidence," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 14(1), pages 1-24, December.
    14. Beyer, Anne & Cohen, Daniel A. & Lys, Thomas Z. & Walther, Beverly R., 2010. "The financial reporting environment: Review of the recent literature," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 296-343, December.
    15. Dale Griffin & Omrane Guedhami & Chuck C Y Kwok & Kai Li & Liang Shao, 2017. "National culture: The missing country-level determinant of corporate governance," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 48(6), pages 740-762, August.
    16. Rizzo, Emanuele, 2018. "Essays on corporate governance and the impact of regulation on financial markets," Other publications TiSEM b5158260-ea13-4763-b992-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    17. Timo Korkeamäki & Elina Rainio & Tuomas Takalo, 2013. "Reforming corporate law in an emerging market," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 21(3), pages 509-551, July.
    18. James O’Donovan & Hannes F Wagner & Stefan Zeume, 2019. "The Value of Offshore Secrets: Evidence from the Panama Papers," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 32(11), pages 4117-4155.
    19. Balachandran, Balasingham & Faff, Robert, 2015. "Corporate governance, firm value and risk: Past, present, and future," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 35(PA), pages 1-12.
    20. Margaret A. Abernethy & Wei Li & Yunyan Zhang & Hanzhong Shi, 2023. "Firm culture and internal control system," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 63(3), pages 3095-3123, September.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:68:y:2022:i:1:p:654-668. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Asher (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/inforea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.