IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/inm/ormksc/v5y1986i1p55-69.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Profitable Pricing When Market Segments Overlap

Author

Listed:
  • Eitan Gerstner

    (North Carolina State University)

  • Duncan Holthausen

    (North Carolina State University)

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze profitable pricing strategies when market segments overlap. Overlapping markets are segments that are not perfectly sealed, and leakage between them can occur. Different consumers are assumed to incur possibly different transaction costs if they choose to purchase in the low-price market. A monopolist seller knows the distribution of transaction costs across consumers and must choose an optimal pricing strategy. In particular, the monopolist must decide whether to charge a single price or to price differentiate. Conditions are derived under which price differentiation will be the most profitable strategy. When price differentiation is optimal, the equilibrium amount of leakage is determined endogenously. Unlike the standard economics textbook model of price discrimination in which zero leakage is determined exogenously and is usually given as a necessary condition for price discrimination, we show that zero leakage is not necessary for differential pricing to be optimal, and that price differentiation can be optimal even when leakage between markets is substantial. We also show that by imposing restrictions on the low-price market buyers, the seller can control leakage and increase profits. Market-specific managerial applications are illustrated.

Suggested Citation

  • Eitan Gerstner & Duncan Holthausen, 1986. "Profitable Pricing When Market Segments Overlap," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 5(1), pages 55-69.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormksc:v:5:y:1986:i:1:p:55-69
    DOI: 10.1287/mksc.5.1.55
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mksc.5.1.55
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1287/mksc.5.1.55?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ozgun Caliskan Demirag & Ozgul Baysar & Pinar Keskinocak & Julie L. Swann, 2010. "The effects of customer rebates and retailer incentives on a manufacturer's profits and sales," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 57(1), pages 88-108, February.
    2. Ying Xiao & Udatta Palekar & Yunchuan Liu, 2011. "Shades of gray—the impact of gray markets on authorized distribution channels," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 155-178, June.
    3. Zhongju Zhang & Juan Feng, 2017. "Price of Identical Product with Gray Market Sales: An Analytical Model and Empirical Analysis," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 28(2), pages 397-412, June.
    4. Evelyn O. Smith & Jeffrey D. Shulman, 2022. "Product diversion by vertically differentiated firms," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 31(5), pages 1928-1939, May.
    5. Reza Ahmadi & B. Rachel Yang, 2000. "Parallel Imports: Challenges from Unauthorized Distribution Channels," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 19(3), pages 279-294, March.
    6. Hai Li & Stuart X. Zhu & Nanfang Cui & Jianbin Li, 2016. "Analysis of gray markets in differentiated duopoly," International Journal of Production Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 54(13), pages 4008-4027, July.
    7. Armstrong, Marcia K. & Gerstner, Eitan & Hess, James D., 1994. "Pocketing The Trade Deal," Promotion in the Marketing Mix: What Works, Where and Why, April 28-29, 1994, Toronto, Canada 279598, Regional Research Projects > NECC-63: Research Committee on Commodity Promotion.
    8. Liao, Chen-Nan & Chen, Ying-Ju, 2019. "Role of exchangeable tickets in the optimal menu design for airline tickets," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 151-163.
    9. Braouezec, Yann, 2012. "Customer-class pricing, parallel trade and the optimal number of market segments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 605-614.
    10. Jaesoo Kim & Dongsoo Shin, 2016. "Price Discrimination with Demarketing," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(4), pages 773-807, December.
    11. Vincent Conitzer & Curtis R. Taylor & Liad Wagman, 2012. "Hide and Seek: Costly Consumer Privacy in a Market with Repeat Purchases," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 31(2), pages 277-292, March.
    12. Heiman, Amir & Ofir, Chezy, 2010. "The effects of imbalanced competition on demonstration strategies," International Journal of Research in Marketing, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 175-187.
    13. Matsui, Kenji, 2014. "Gray-market trade with product information service in global supply chains," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 147(PB), pages 351-361.
    14. Fay, Scott, 2008. "Selling an opaque product through an intermediary: The case of disguising one's product," Journal of Retailing, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 59-75.
    15. Amoy X. Yang, 2019. "Price differentiation model: its challenges and solutions," Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 18(2), pages 123-132, April.
    16. Li, Michael Z. F., 2005. "Pricing non-storable perishable goods by using a purchase restriction: General optimality results," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 161(3), pages 838-853, March.
    17. Zhang, Michael & Bell, Peter C., 2007. "The effect of market segmentation with demand leakage between market segments on a firm's price and inventory decisions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 182(2), pages 738-754, October.
    18. Khouja, Moutaz & Zhou, Jing, 2015. "Channel and pricing decisions in a supply chain with advance selling of gift cards," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 244(2), pages 471-489.
    19. Yuxin Chen & Chakravarthi Narasimhan & Z. John Zhang, 2001. "Individual Marketing with Imperfect Targetability," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 20(1), pages 23-41, November.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:inm:ormksc:v:5:y:1986:i:1:p:55-69. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Asher (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/inforea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.