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Moral Hazard In Deposit Insurance: The Case Of Fobaproa

Author

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  • Clemente Hernández Rodríguez

    (Tecnológico de Monterrey, Campus Guadalajara)

Abstract

Este artículo se divide en dos partes. Primero, presenta el escenario institucional (los esquemas de seguros de depósitos) del sistema de la banca comercial en México. Segundo, muestra, usando un modelo probit que bajo FOBAPROA había un problema de riesgo moral. Uno de los hallazgos es que en un régimen privado FOBAPROA impulsa a los bancos a tener menos capital relativo a activos que cuando estaban bajo control gubernamental. También encuentro que FOBAPROA influye en la tazón préstamos a activos. Sin embargo, no encuentro evidencia, de que FOBAPROA anime a los bancos a tener :una razón baja en excedentes a préstamos o en reservas a depósitos. Debido al riesgo moral asociado con el seguro de depósitos, los bancos en problemas, que tienen una razón pequeña de excedentes a préstamos, tienen un incentivo a tomar posiciones especulativas.

Suggested Citation

  • Clemente Hernández Rodríguez, 2005. "Moral Hazard In Deposit Insurance: The Case Of Fobaproa," Remef - Revista Mexicana de Economía y Finanzas Nueva Época REMEF (The Mexican Journal of Economics and Finance), Instituto Mexicano de Ejecutivos de Finanzas, IMEF, vol. 4(2), pages 101-113, Junio 200.
  • Handle: RePEc:imx:journl:v:4:y:2005:i:2:p:101-113
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    File URL: http://www.remef.org.mx/index.php/primera/article/view/196
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Anne Krueger & Aaron Tornell, 1999. "The Role of Bank Restructuring in Recovering from Crises: Mexico 1995-98," NBER Working Papers 7042, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Wheelock, David C & Wilson, Paul W, 1995. "Explaining Bank Failures: Deposit Insurance, Regulation, and Efficiency," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 77(4), pages 689-700, November.
    3. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
    4. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    5. Alston Lee J. & Grove Wayne A. & Wheelock David C., 1994. "Why Do Banks Fail? Evidence from the 1920s," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 409-431, October.
    6. Wheelock, David C & Kumbhakar, Subal C, 1995. "Which Banks Choose Deposit Insurance? Evidence of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in a Voluntary Insurance System," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(1), pages 186-201, February.
    7. Edward J. Kane, 1985. "The Gathering Crisis in Federal Deposit Insurance," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262611856, December.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    FOBAPROA; Moral Hazard; Government Deposit Insurance; Probit Model;

    JEL classification:

    • C35 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • N26 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Latin America; Caribbean

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