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Dynamic Model of Credit Risk in Relationship Lending: A Game- Theoretic Real Options Approach

Author

Listed:
  • Takashi Shibata

    (Associate Professor, Tokyo Metropolitan University (E-mail: tshibata@tmu.ac.jp))

  • Tetsuya Yamada

    (Deputy Director and Economist, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan (E-mail: tetsuya.yamada@boj.or.jp))

Abstract

We develop a dynamic credit risk model for the case in which banks compete to collect their loans from a firm in danger of bankruptcy. We apply a game-theoretic real options approach to investigate banks f optimal strategies. Our model reveals that the bank with the larger loan amount, namely, the main bank, provides an additional loan to support the deteriorating firm when the other bank collects its loan. This suggests that there exists rational forbearance lending by the main bank. Comparative statics show that as the liquidation value is lower, the optimal exit timing for the nonmain bank comes at an earlier stage in the business downturn and the optimal liquidation timing by the main bank is delayed further. As the interest rate of the loan is lower, the optimal exit timing for the non-main bank comes earlier. These analyses are consistent with the forbearance lending and exposure concentration of main banks observed in Japan.

Suggested Citation

  • Takashi Shibata & Tetsuya Yamada, 2009. "Dynamic Model of Credit Risk in Relationship Lending: A Game- Theoretic Real Options Approach," Monetary and Economic Studies, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, vol. 27(1), pages 195-218, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:ime:imemes:v:27:y:2009:i:1:p:195-218
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    File URL: http://www.imes.boj.or.jp/research/papers/english/me27-10.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Helen Weeds, 2002. "Strategic Delay in a Real Options Model of R&D Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(3), pages 729-747.
    2. Mella-Barral, Pierre & Perraudin, William, 1997. " Strategic Debt Service," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 531-556, June.
    3. Grenadier, Steven R, 1996. " The Strategic Exercise of Options: Development Cascades and Overbuilding in Real Estate Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(5), pages 1653-1679, December.
    4. Elyasiani, Elyas & Goldberg, Lawrence G., 2004. "Relationship lending: a survey of the literature," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 56(4), pages 315-330.
    5. Baba, Naohiko, 2001. "Optimal Timing in Banks' Write-Off Decisions under the Possible Implementation of a Subsidy Scheme: A Real Options Approach," Monetary and Economic Studies, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, vol. 19(3), pages 113-141, November.
    6. Boot, Arnoud W. A., 2000. "Relationship Banking: What Do We Know?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 7-25, January.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Tetsuya Yamada, 2010. "Accelerated Investment and Credit Risk under a Low Interest Rate Environment: A Real Options Approach," Monetary and Economic Studies, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, vol. 28, pages 181-214, November.
    2. Kobayashi, Mami & Osano, Hiroshi, 2011. "The new main bank system," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 336-354, September.
    3. Tetsuya Yamada, 2010. "Accelerated Investment and Credit Risk under a Low Interest Rate Environment: A Real Options Approach," IMES Discussion Paper Series 10-E-08, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.
    4. Nakashima, Kiyotaka & Takahashi, Koji, 2016. "Termination of Bank-Firm Relationships," MPRA Paper 70670, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Credit risk; Relationship lending; Real option; Game theory; Concentration risk;

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D92 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation

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