Financial Predation by the "Weak"
We consider a Stackelberg game, where a financially constrained leader competes with a "deep pocket" follower, and analyze the trade-off between a financial and a strategic advantage for both the design of financial contracts and market structure.
Volume (Year): 5 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
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