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Optimal Contract, Imperfect Output Observation and Limited Liability

Author

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  • Lawarree, J.P.
  • Van Audenrode, M.

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Lawarree, J.P. & Van Audenrode, M., 1993. "Optimal Contract, Imperfect Output Observation and Limited Liability," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 93-07, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:washer:93-07
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    Cited by:

    1. Kim, Doyoung & Lawarree, Jacques & Shin, Dongsoo, 2004. "Exit option in hierarchical agency," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(8-9), pages 1265-1287, November.
    2. Isabelle Brocas, 2005. "Multistage Contracting with Applications to R&D and Insurance Policies," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(2), pages 317-346, May.
    3. Khalil, Fahad & Lawarree, Jacques, 2001. "Catching the agent on the wrong foot: ex post choice of monitoring," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 327-347, December.
    4. Goldl├╝cke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2016. "Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments," CEPR Discussion Papers 11217, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Spiros Bougheas & Saksit Thananittayaudom, 2006. "Financial Predation by the "Weak"," International Journal of Business and Economics, College of Business and College of Finance, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 5(3), pages 231-244, December.
    6. Dang, Viet Anh, 2010. "Optimal financial contracts with hidden effort, unobservable profits and endogenous costs of effort," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 75-89, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    contracts ; economic models;

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