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A Decision-Making Model of Low-Carbon Supply Chain Based on Government Subsidy

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  • Xu Qi
  • Xiao Li-Jun

Abstract

In order to study the role of government subsidy in a low-carbon supply chain, a two-stage game model for the subsidy of low-carbon technology and the subsidy of recycling is built. And the optimized subsidy strategy under the two kinds of subsidy policies is obtained. This paper also studies the impacts of carbon emission abatement, subsidy and the factors of subsidy on the supply chain and the government, so as to compare the two kinds of subsidy strategy. This study shows that the coefficient of environmental benefits has a positive impact on the two kinds of subsidy. The subsidy can stimulate the carbon emission abatement, and the fixed cost has a negative impact on the will of the carbon emission abatement for the enterprises. Besides, the low-carbon preference of the consumers has a positive impact on the carbon emission abatement under the subsidy of low-carbon technology. Furthermore, the government under takes the main costs of the low-carbon technology under the subsidy of low-carbon technology. The environmental benefit also has a positive impact on the subsidy and profits of the government and the profits of the supply chain under the recycling subsidy. Both kinds of subsidy strategies can achieve supply chain coordination.

Suggested Citation

  • Xu Qi & Xiao Li-Jun, 2016. "A Decision-Making Model of Low-Carbon Supply Chain Based on Government Subsidy," International Journal of Business and Management, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 11(2), pages 221-221, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:ibn:ijbmjn:v:11:y:2016:i:2:p:221
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. d'Aspremont, Claude & Jacquemin, Alexis, 1988. "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1133-1137, December.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

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