Sins of the elder: Fiscal illusion in democracies
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsDemocratic maturity; Fiscal Illusion; rent-seeking.;
- H6 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt
- O11 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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