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Tax Rates, Tax Evasion, and Growth in a Multi-period Economy

Author

Listed:
  • Jordi Caballé

    (Unitat de Fonaments de l’Anàlisi Econòmica and CODE, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)

  • Judith Panadés

    (Unitat de Fonaments de l’Anàlisi Econòmica and CODE, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)

Abstract

We extend the basic tax evasion model to a multi-period economy exhibiting sustained growth. When individuals conceal part of their true income from the tax authority, they face the risk of being audited and hence of paying the corresponding fine. Both taxes and fines determine individual saving and the rate of capital accumulation. We show that, if the penalty imposed on tax evaders is proportional to the amount of evaded taxes, then the growth rate is decreasing in the tax rate. However, the relationship between growth and tax rate becomes non-monotonic when the penalty rate is imposed on the amount of evaded income.

Suggested Citation

  • Jordi Caballé & Judith Panadés, 2007. "Tax Rates, Tax Evasion, and Growth in a Multi-period Economy," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 183(4), pages 67-80, december.
    • Handle: RePEc:hpe:journl:y:2007:v:183:i:4:p:67-80
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jordi Caballé & Judith Panadés, 2005. "Cost Uncertainty and Taxpayer Compliance," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 12(3), pages 239-263, May.
    2. Poterba, James M, 1987. "Tax Evasion and Capital Gains Taxation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 234-239, May.
    3. Been-Lon Chen, 2003. "Tax Evasion in a Model of Endogenous Growth," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 6(2), pages 381-403, April.
    4. Landskroner, Yoram & Paroush, J & Swary, Itzhak, 1990. "Tax Evasion and Portfolio Decisions," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 45(3), pages 409-422.
    5. Panades, Judith, 2001. "Tax evasion and Ricardian equivalence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 799-815, November.
    6. Judith Panadés, 2004. "Tax Evasion and Relative Tax Contribution," Public Finance Review, , vol. 32(2), pages 183-195, March.
    7. Clotfelter, Charles T, 1983. "Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual Returns," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 65(3), pages 363-373, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Cerqueti, Roy & Coppier, Raffaella, 2011. "Economic growth, corruption and tax evasion," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(1-2), pages 489-500, January.
    2. Richard J. Cebula, 2014. "The underground economy in the U.S.A.: preliminary new evidence on the impact of income tax rates (and other factors) on aggregate tax evasion 1975-2008," PSL Quarterly Review, Economia civile, vol. 67(271), pages 451-481.
    3. Dzhumashev, Ratbek & Levaggi, Rosella & Menoncin, Francesco, 2023. "Optimal tax enforcement with productive public inputs," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
    4. Paraskevi Koufopoulou & Colin C. Williams & Athanassios Vozikis & Kyriakos Souliotis, 2019. "Shadow Economy: Definitions, terms & theoretical considerations," Advances in Management and Applied Economics, SCIENPRESS Ltd, vol. 9(5), pages 1-3.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tax evasion; Growth;

    JEL classification:

    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • O41 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models

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