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Los incentivos extrínsecos y el cumplimiento fiscal
[Extrinsic incentives and tax compliance]

Author

Listed:
  • Sour, Laura
  • Gutiérrez Andrade, Miguel Ángel

Abstract

This paper models the impact of extrinsic incentives in a tax compliance model. It also provides experimental evidence that confirms the existence of a positive relationship between rewards and tax compliance. If individuals are audited, rewards for honest taxpayers are effective in increasing the level of tax compliance. These results are particularly relevant in countries where there is little respect for tax law since rewards can contribute to crowding in the intrinsic motivation to comply.

Suggested Citation

  • Sour, Laura & Gutiérrez Andrade, Miguel Ángel, 2011. "Los incentivos extrínsecos y el cumplimiento fiscal [Extrinsic incentives and tax compliance]," MPRA Paper 66066, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:66066
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    compliance with tax obligations; intrinsic motivation; experiments; rewards.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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