System Dynamics Modeling of Individual Transferable Quota Fisheries and Suggestions for Rebuilding Stocks
This paper develops a system dynamics model of Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) systems in order to differentiate ITQ from total allowable catch (TAC) effects and to identify areas where policy changes and management improvement may be most effective. ITQ systems provide incentives for long-term stewardship but when fisheries are managed “at the edge,” the incentives are inadequate for stock rebuilding. The free-market design of ITQ systems means that fishermen may be in conflict with the long-run, public sustainability goals of fishery management. An adaptive control scheme with a contingent public/private transfer payment is proposed to improve long-term results for both the local community and the general public.
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- Jentoft, Svein, 2000. "The community: a missing link of fisheries management," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 53-60, January.
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