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Socioeconomics of Individual Transferable Quotas and Community-Based Fishery Management

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  • Copes, Parzival
  • Charles, Anthony T.

Abstract

In many fisheries around the world, the failures of centralized, top-down management have produced a shift toward co-management - collaboration and sharing of decision making between government and stakeholders. This trend has led to a major debate between two very different co-management approaches - community-based fishery management and market-based individual transferable quota management. This paper examines the debate over the relative merits of these models and undertakes a socioeconomic analysis of the two approaches. The paper includes (1) an analysis of differences in the structure, philosophical nature, and underlying value systems of each, including a discussion of their treatment of property rights; (2) a socioeconomic evaluation of the impacts of each system on boat owners, fishers, crew members, other fishery participants, and coastal communities, as well as the distribution of benefits and costs among fishery participants; and (3) examination of indirect economic effects that can occur through impacts on conservation and fishery sustainability. The latter relate to (a) the conservation ethic, (b) the flexibility of management, (c) the avoidance of waste, and (d) the efficiency of enforcement. The paper emphasizes the need for a broader approach to analyzing fishery management options, one that recognizes and properly assesses the diversity of choices, and that takes into account the interaction of the fishery with broader community and regional realities.

Suggested Citation

  • Copes, Parzival & Charles, Anthony T., 2004. "Socioeconomics of Individual Transferable Quotas and Community-Based Fishery Management," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 33(2), pages 1-11, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:arerjl:31263
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.31263
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Parzival Copes, 1986. "A Critical Review of the Individual Quota as a Device in Fisheries Management," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 62(3), pages 278-291.
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    Cited by:

    1. Basak Bayramoglu & Brian Copeland & Jean-François Jacques, 2018. "Trade and fisheries subsidies [Le commerce international et les subventions à la pêche]," Post-Print hal-02624649, HAL.
    2. Tim Gray, 2024. "Fishing for Principles: The Fairness of Fishing Quota Allocations," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 16(12), pages 1-23, June.
    3. Bayramoglu, Basak & Copeland, Brian R. & Jacques, Jean-Francois, 2018. "Trade and fisheries subsidies," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 13-32.
    4. Matthew N. Reimer & Joshua K. Abbott & James E. Wilen, 2014. "Unraveling the Multiple Margins of Rent Generation from Individual Transferable Quotas," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 90(3), pages 538-559.
    5. Pinkerton, Evelyn, 2015. "The role of moral economy in two British Columbia fisheries: Confronting neoliberal policies," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 410-419.
    6. Wenjun Li & Carol Kerven, 2024. "Between commons and anticommons: a nested common-private interface framework," Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 11(1), pages 1-13, December.
    7. Speir, Cameron & Lee, Min-Yang, 2021. "Geographic Distribution of Commercial Fishing Landings and Port Consolidation Following ITQ Implementation," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 46(01), January.
    8. Villamayor-Tomas, Sergio, 2014. "Cooperation in common property regimes under extreme drought conditions: Empirical evidence from the use of pooled transferable quotas in Spanish irrigation systems," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 482-493.
    9. Byrne, Conor & Oostdijk, Maartje & Agnarsson, Sveinn & Davidsdottir, Brynhildur, 2024. "The Transitional Gains Trap in Grandfathered Individual Transferable Quota Fisheries," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 215(C).
    10. Lucchetti, Alessandro & Piccinetti, Corrado & Meconi, Uriano & Frittelloni, Cristina & Marchesan, Mara & Palladino, Silvia & Virgili, Massimo, 2014. "Transferable Fishing Concessions (TFC): A pilot study on the applicability in the Mediterranean Sea," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 438-447.
    11. Davis, Reade, 2015. "‘All in’: Snow crab, capitalization, and the future of small-scale fisheries in Newfoundland," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 323-330.
    12. Azaguagh, Ismail & Driouchi, Ahmed, 2018. "Understanding Commons and Anticommons in different economic contexts," MPRA Paper 116621, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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