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Sustainable Development Pathways for China’s Copper Industry: A Three-Way Evolutionary Game Approach

Author

Listed:
  • Chen Wang

    (College of Environmental Science and Engineering, Nankai University, Tianjin 300350, China)

  • Jinfen Huo

    (College of Environmental Science and Engineering, Nankai University, Tianjin 300350, China)

  • Fenghao Zhang

    (College of Environmental Science and Engineering, Nankai University, Tianjin 300350, China)

  • Wanying Lin

    (College of Environmental Science and Engineering, Nankai University, Tianjin 300350, China)

  • Yinglun Zhao

    (College of Environmental Science and Engineering, Nankai University, Tianjin 300350, China)

  • Youfei Ma

    (College of Environmental Science and Engineering, Nankai University, Tianjin 300350, China)

  • Xuan Shi

    (College of Environmental Science and Engineering, Nankai University, Tianjin 300350, China)

  • Yunfei Ma

    (College of Environmental Science and Engineering, Nankai University, Tianjin 300350, China)

  • Han Yu

    (Shenzhen Research Institute, Nankai University, Shenzhen 518063, China)

  • Yan Lin

    (College of Environmental Science and Engineering, Nankai University, Tianjin 300350, China)

Abstract

Sustainable development is a tripartite game among the central (CG) and local governments (LGs) and enterprises, with economic factors as key drivers. China consumed about 16.2 million metric tons during this period, accounting for approximately 61% of global consumption, thereby reinforcing its position as the world’s leading copper consumer. Seeking a balance of acceptable interests among the three parties may be a feasible method to explore the sustainable development of China’s copper enterprises (CEs). Therefore, based on evolutionary game theory, we construct a three-party evolutionary game model. Using the financial data of Chinese CEs and actual survey data on the CG and LGs, we identified 31 environmental impact parameters from the CG, LGs, and CEs. Then, we used MATLAB R2023b to simulate an evolution model and determined the influence of various factors on the evolutionary stable state. The results show that LGs, as local managers, have implemented more direct and expedited regulations than the CG. Enterprises with less brand impact frequently face difficulties in complying with governmental regulatory demands. When interests are balanced, 30% of enterprises cannot meet standards within 40 months, which may cause 500 small and medium-sized enterprises to stop production, thus resulting in high unemployment costs for LGs. A scenario analysis evaluates the economic benefits of environmental measures based on evolutionary game results. The results show that the introduction of advanced hydrometallurgy technology has the highest economic benefits; after 5 years, the economic benefits of China’s entire copper industry will reach CNY 147.2 billion.

Suggested Citation

  • Chen Wang & Jinfen Huo & Fenghao Zhang & Wanying Lin & Yinglun Zhao & Youfei Ma & Xuan Shi & Yunfei Ma & Han Yu & Yan Lin, 2025. "Sustainable Development Pathways for China’s Copper Industry: A Three-Way Evolutionary Game Approach," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 17(7), pages 1-18, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:17:y:2025:i:7:p:2838-:d:1618390
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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